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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Research Questions and Arguments 
This thesis examines Senegalese migration to Europe, particularly Spain, and seeks to 
show how the migration project of Senegalese families is shaped by structural factors in 
Senegal and Spain, as well as the (re-)production of identity as men and women.  The 
migration project contains a strategy for changing one’s own predicament; a ‘path’ 
chosen by an agent from within the range of options for achieving better life 
opportunities conceived as feasible. The migration project is also a complex movement in 
a social landscape where gender, generation, household, kinship, and social networks are 
shaping the agent’s position within the Senegalese socio-economical structure (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977).  Moreover, my understanding of migration emphasizes the global 
connections and the ‘embeddedness’ of economic action in social relations and 
institutions (cf. Tsing 2005).  Migration thus means choosing a course of action from 
within the confines of structural frameworks such as social norms and the global 
dynamics of the market economy.   
 
Expectations and ambitions towards life in general and migration in particular are 
intrinsically linked to identity.  Important aspects of identity in the context of my research 
project are gender and generation.  Identity is not a constant entity but shaped throughout 
one’s life by different dynamics within and around you, in the same way as culture and 
society is in constant flux (cf. Jenkins 2004, Moore 1994).  The constant processes of 
change within Senegalese society and culture, and the world at large, provide for 
generational and gender conflicts.  I shall here try to map out some of these conflicts and 
the way they are linked to migration.  I (tentatively) argue that times of crisis, such as the 
current financial crisis, can challenge and enforce hegemonic discourses on (gender) 
identity, while rendering visible the changes that are occurring in the conceptualization of 
self and others.  These conceptualizations might then influence important life decisions, 
like those having to be made concerning the migration project. 
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Migration in the Senegalese context is arguably gendered, and is more likely to be 
pursued by men.  This thesis examines the processes gendering the migration project, and 
suggests that marriage can be a feminine ‘parallel’ strategy for socioeconomic 
advancement. The narratives of my informants show that the implementation of these 
strategies is not free of conflict.  Senegalese men and women are part of the process of 
shaping the different and conflicting discourses and practices of gender, as discourses and 
practices of identity are shaped on various levels and by various agents (cf. Moore 1994).  
Senegalese gender identity is thus continuously renegotiated, fed by discourses and 
practices on a local, national, and global scale. I will discuss how my informants’ 
discourses on ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ reveal the Senegalese structures of kinship, 
household, and society that are a part of this renegotiation of identity.  The way in which 
migration, ‘modernity’, and globalization play a role in this renegotiation allows for a 
very interesting research project. 
 
By inquiring about Senegalese migrants and their families’ ambitions and expectations 
towards the migration project, I have sought to understand how Senegalese, particularly 
masculine, gender identity is played out in a global context that is perpetually undergoing 
change.  Gender identity is significant when it comes to how and by whom Senegalese 
migration is carried out, but it is not ‘immune’ to the global dynamics it is shaped within.  
When the Senegalese household is ‘transnationalized’ and ‘globalized’ it has implications 
for how gender roles are perceived and practiced.  These processes are what I wish to 
elaborate on in this thesis, especially those influenced by the current recession in Spain.  
Consequently, my main research questions are as follows: 
 
1. In what ways is gender a crucial factor of Senegalese migration projects as a 
principle shaping the migrant’s quest for socioeconomic advancement? 
2. How does the formation of Senegalese (masculine) gender identity interact with 
the processes of constant change of which the transnational migrant household is 
a part through its place in a globalized world? 
3. Particularly; how might Senegalese social institutions (such as kinship, 
generational relations, tradition, and the household) and gender identity affect and 
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be affected by the predicaments of the current economic recession, seeing as they 
are shaped in the transaction between global and national structures and 
discourses? 
4. How does the friction between agent and structures play out when it comes to 
Senegalese migrants and the Spanish state, especially considering the current 
economic crisis? 
 
Also, as a backdrop throughout this thesis lie the following theoretical questions:  What 
are the processes that shape migration and marriage as paths towards a ‘good life’?  Are 
these paths an outcome of structures shaping the (potential) migrant’s desires, ambitions 
and decisions?  Or do they take shape through the agency of the individual? 
 
 
Aim of Project: Understanding the Interconnections between 
Migration, Globalization, and Senegalese Social Relations and 
Identities  
I consider the above research questions to be important as they are very much queries of 
our time.  The aspiration of this thesis is to contribute to the field of knowledge 
concerning migration in general and Senegalese migration to Spain, especially the 
Basque Country, in particular.  As I explain more thoroughly below, immigration to the 
Spanish state is a relatively new phenomenon compared to immigration to the rest of the 
Western world, and I therefore see a need for more research within this field of interest.   
 
Migration however is not a new phenomenon in itself; it has been a strategy for and 
process of life improvement since time immemorial.  Still, the ‘face’ of migration 
changed during the 20th and 21st century.  It no longer marks such an abrupt break with 
the place you leave behind; the diasporas of today’s world are to a much larger extent 
continuously bound to their place of origin, through both thought and action (Appadurai 
1998, Fuglerud 2001).  Migration has also contributed to a new way of thinking about 
culture and social structures within anthropology and the social sciences in general:   
When we study migration rather than abstract cultural flows or 
representations, we see that transnational processes are located within the 
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life experience of individuals and families, making up the warp and the 
woof of daily activities, concerns, fears, and achievements. (Schiller et al. 
1995:50) 
 
In this sense my field of research is not only an effort to understand how contemporary 
migration unfolds.  It can potentially shed significant light on other aspects of human 
action and interaction, since how and why people move can render visible cultural 
processes otherwise unseen. 
 
Spain stands out in a European context when migration is concerned due to its rapid 
population growth on account of immigration, and because of it is one of the countries in 
Europe where the current economic recession has had the most effect.  The informal1 
labor market in Spain evolved along with the economic growth the country experienced 
since the 1980s.  This growth enabled the local population to move into more high-skilled 
work, leaving a need for low-skilled and unskilled laborers, and thus a place for 
immigrants in the Spanish economy and labor market.  According to Eurostat the number 
of resident citizens with foreign nationality living in Spain had reached 5,262,095 in 2008, 
amounting to 11.6% of the population2.  Of these, 40% are from the EU3, 29.5% from 
South America, and 17.2% from Africa 4 .  Of the non-European immigrant groups 
Moroccans is the biggest (644,688), followed by Ecuadorians (420,110) and Colombians 
(280,705).  The number of registered Senegalese living in Spain in 2007 was 37 000 and 
increasing5. 
 
Senegal is also an interesting context when it comes to migration studies. As this thesis 
illustrates, migration holds great social and economical importance for the country’s 
inhabitants due to the remittances sent by migrants to their families at home.  
                                                 
1
 Also called secondary labor market. 
2
 Eurostat 2008: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00
157  
3
 Citizens of Rumania, the UK and Germany are the biggest groups. 
4
 INE, June 2008: http://www.ine.es/prensa/np503.pdf 
5
 INE 2007: http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do 
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Additionally, Senegal has served as a sort of West African gateway to ‘illegal’ 
immigration the last few years through the ‘pirogue route’ to the Canary Islands, after 
other routes via Morocco and Mauritania have been made increasingly more difficult 
through border patrolling and bilateral agreements between European countries and their 
African counterparts (Hernández 2008). 
 
The current economic recession, la crisis or la crise mondial6, which is having severe 
effects in both Senegal and Spain, became an important aspect of my research as it 
illustrates the interconnectedness between the Southern and Northern hemispheres.  My 
thesis also seeks to assess the impacts of the crisis not only on economic activity but also 
on the most intimate parts of people’s lives:  The analysis of how migration, which is 
very much impacted by the current crisis, affects Senegalese gender relations and identity 
construction can serve as one example of how economy is about more than ‘rational 
actors’ seeking maximization of profit and income (cf. Fagertun 2009).   Migration is also 
about how people get by and how they work the social structures they are a part of in 
order to make the most out of life, for themselves and those close to them.  These 
practices are embedded in discourses on (gender) identity (cf. Moore 1994). 
 
Regional Contexts   
Multi-sited fieldwork, or “mobile ethnography”, a recent development within 
anthropology, is about adapting methodology to meet new ethnographic realities “in 
response to empirical changes in the world and therefore to transformed locations of 
cultural production” (Marcus 1995:97).  I thereby trust that my use of two field sites can 
shed light on how gender identities and subject positions (Moore 1994) are being (re-) 
produced in a Senegalese context; a context that includes Senegal, the Basque Country in 
Spain, and the time/space continuum in between. 
                                                 
6
 The current economic recession is called la crisis in Spain and la crise mondial in Senegal.  The Spanish 
use of simply ‘the crisis’ seems to imply how closely people are experiencing this event.  In Senegal 
conditions have not changed as much the last couple of years, according to my informants; ‘the world 
crisis’ thus seems to imply that the recession is experienced as more distant from people’s lives than in 
Spain. 
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Two Field Sites:  Senegal and Spain 
To address the questions above I deemed it important to conduct my research in both of 
the places relevant to the Senegalese migration project; the sender and the receiver 
countries.  In this case Senegal represents the former, while the Basque country in Spain 
the latter and I will briefly present my two field sites below.   
 
I believe that having two field sites allows for a more profound comprehension of the 
Senegalese migrant’s predicament compared to what an analysis of only one of the field 
sites would bring to the table.  Senegalese migration is arguably very much a family 
endeavor (cf. Riccio 2008, Cotula et al. 2004) and to get both sides of the story, the one 
of those abroad and of those back home, is important:  It is in the relationships between 
people that identity is shaped, in the “interplay [between] similarity and difference” 
(Jenkins 2004:16).  Also, since most Senegalese migrants are men, having two field sites 
was of substantial significance, so as to comprehend the transnationality of the 
Senegalese household (including the women back home).  Furthermore, during my 
fieldwork in the Basque Country, my plans of going to Senegal became a way of building 
rapport among my informants; I was going to “understand them better” once I had 
experienced their homeland.  I hold this to be true when it comes to migration research in 
general; where one has been socialized is part of one’s history and must thus be part of a 
study of the processes that has lead this individual to part for greener pastures.  Migration 
is what you leave behind, what you are searching for, what you find, and the personal 
relationships that bind these together:  “[A]n immigrant is always and also an emigrant” 
(Riccio 2008:218). 
Spain: Economic Recession Changes Attitudes towards Immigrants Workers 
Spain has been, until quite recent history, a land of emigrants, not immigrants.  Migration 
in Spain has consisted mostly in internal migration; from rural regions to urban centers 
and from south to north.  An example of this is the large migration from the regions of 
Andalucía, Extremadura and Galícia to Bilbao.  It was not until the mid-80s that 
immigration into the Spanish state started to take shape (cf. Solé 2003, Calavita 2006).  
Since then immigration has been the major reason for Spain’s rapid population growth.  
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The main attraction for the transnational immigrants coming to Spain since the 1990s has 
been the blooming labor market provided by the second extensive7 economic growth 
period the country has experienced since the 1980s especially due to the expanding 
tourism industry and foreign investment.  Both factors serve as so-called immigration 
‘pull factors’ in terms of stimulating a secondary labor market based on an “informal and 
underground economy” with “casual, unorganised labour” (King 1993:288) that depends 
on ‘black’ employment.  In southern Spain it has largely been construction (often of 
apartments and hotels for the tourist industry) and (seasonal) agriculture that have 
provided job opportunities for foreign laborers. In contrast, the now highly de-
industrialized Basque Country, with its economy largely based on the tertiary economic 
sector, has had less immigration than the south due to the relatively smaller size of its 
informal secondary labor market 8.   
 
Because of the ongoing economic recession the Spanish and Basque labor market are 
going through significant change in terms of who are willing to do what and who are 
wanted in which sector. Unemployment in Spain is soaring at a record high of 18.83%9.  
The autonomous community of the Basque Country has not been hit as hard (11.75%10), 
but the situation is causing different cases of antagonism towards immigrant workers on 
both national and regional levels, a tendency made visible by a public turn towards the 
political right11.  With the escalation of unemployment, especially in the construction 
                                                 
7
 The first period of extensive economic growth in Spain was in the 1950s and 60s via Franco’s turn to 
market liberalization and cooperation with the USA, the IMF and the World Bank. 
8
 The largest foreign populations are in Cataluña (194 287), Madrid (171 611), Comutitat Valenciana 
(123 918), and Andalucia (110 741), while the Basque Country has 24 421 foreign residents, according to 
INE. 
9
 Numbers from the last quarter of 2009, according to press release delivered by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE) January 29, 2010 (http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/daco4211/epa0409.pdf ) and  The 
Times Online April 25, 2009: 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article6164629.ece 
10
 Numbers from the last quarter of 2009, from INE, published in “Tablas provinciales”:  
http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/daco4211/epapro0409.pdf  
11
The Wall Street Journal, June 06, 2009: “Election Sets Back German Left Wing”: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124448519579794935.html 
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sector, immigrant workers seem to be hit especially hard12.  One of the reasons might be 
that secondary market workers hold few legal rights when it comes to guarantees and 
economic support from the government, but unemployment hits immigrants working in 
registered jobs as well.   
 
Historically migrants have often been the “last to be hired and the first to be fired” (Frost 
1999:82).  The example of Kru migrant workers, a West African ethnic group with long 
traditions for labor migration, in 20th century Britain (Frost 1999:82), shows that one can 
expect an increase in conflict between domestic and migrant workers when the niche they 
both operate within is reduced (cf. Barth 1956).  The Kru in Liverpool had taken over 
many of the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs the British soldiers of World War I had left 
behind, and thus filled a very necessary societal and economic function in Britain.  The 
problem arose during the inter-war years when the soldiers returned and jobs became 
scarce, resulting in both overt and covert tension between the different ethnic groups, as 
seen in the race riots of 1919, and further on, as the world entered into the economic 
recession of the 1930s.  As a result of these riots many whites refused to continue 
working with blacks and other immigrants, meaning the latter were left unemployed.  The 
situation led to stigmatization of immigrants as so-called benefit scroungers; “lazy, 
parasites living on the dole and of “immoral earnings” (Frost 1999:82).  As mentioned 
above one can already see these tendencies forming, e.g. in the anti-immigrant sentiments 
that were expressed in the right-wing votes of the EU Parliament elections of June 2009 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Vancouver Sun, June 07, 2009: “How governments fared in European Parliament vote”: 
http://www.vancouversun.com/business/fp/governments+fared+European+Parliament+vote/1672539/st
ory.html 
The Euro Weekly News Group, June 11, 2009: “Centre-right parties win European elections”:  
http://www.euroweeklynews.com/2009061156192/news/costa-del-sol/centre-right-parties-win-
european-elections.html 
EurActiv.Com, June 05, 2009: “Dutch far-right seen surging in EU poll”: http://www.euractiv.com/en/eu-
elections/dutch-far-right-seen-surging-eu-poll/article-182878?Ref=RSS 
12
 A search through Spanish newspapers renders no doubt about the evidence.  Immigrants are those who 
are more likely to lose their job.  El País (November 11, 2009) reports that unemployment among 
immigrants in the Basque Country rose with 70% between 2008 and 2009, and that is only counting those 
who are registered and “legal” immigrants 
(http://www.elpais.com/articulo/pais/vasco/paro/inmigrantes/crece/ultimo/ano/elpepiesppvs/20091122
elpvas_9/Tes),  
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and the portrayal of the immigrant as criminal, lazy, trouble-making and as taking 
advantage of the Spanish state’s welfare system13.  An escalation in and expansion of 
such stigmatizing discourses can become more prominent due to the recession, affecting 
the Senegalese migrants’ situation and status within Spanish society.  This can have 
implications for his migration project. 
The Basque Country: A Special Case of Migration Experiences 
Migration has had particular meaning in the Basque Country due to its role in the 
historical construction of Basque nationalist identity.  Spain as a state is, as seen above, a 
comparatively new site for immigration when looking to Europe as a whole, but when it 
comes to Bilbao, its fifth largest city, immigration has been an important part of recent 
history.  From the start of the region’s industrialization, but especially during the 1960s 
and 70s, a significant shift in Bilbao’s demography took place, a seemingly direct cause 
of the boom of an urban industrial center, offering those willing to move the opportunity 
to be part of the blooming economic sector of northern Spanish territory.  The ones who 
decided to emigrate were particularly people from poor, rural regions of Spain, from 
Extremadura, Andalucía, Galicia, whose culture contrasted with that of the urban Basque 
bourgeoisie and other city dwellers.    
 
The Basque Country’s reigning post war status14  and the presence of the immigrant 
‘foreigners’ caused the nationalist movement towards Basque independence from Spain 
to flourish under Sabino Arana’s fierce and conservative leadership during the late 
19th/early 20th century.  The ideology of Basque nationalism, constructed by Arana and 
his followers, was one of a strong racialized, and even racist, discourse, claiming Basque 
physical and moral superiority over the ‘small dark people’ of the South.  The Basque 
Country has thus been a place of cultural contrasts for well over a century, a contrast its 
                                                 
13
 I have done searches online in some of the major Spanish and Basque newspapers and looked at how 
immigrants are portrayed both in the articles and, especially, in the comments people can leave 
anonymously underneath.  These comments can portray a good image of the actual opinion of “the 
street”, since one is not obliged to leave any trace of one’s actual identity and does thus not risk being 
stigmatized (in “real life”) as e.g. a racist when voicing your opinion. 
14
 Compliments of the Carlist Wars, where, amongst other central issues, the Basque Country’s special 
rights, the fueros, were fought over and ultimately lost 
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people have grown accustomed to, though not forgotten, as seen in the present separatist 
discourse in both political directions.   
 
The Basque labor market is mostly made up of the service sector and some industry, 
although fishing is an important sector in some coastal areas. The secondary economy 
and labor market is relatively small but usually better paid than in other parts of Spain.  
The number of immigrants here is also lower. The Senegalese population in the Bilbao 
area is thus not very large compared to other Spanish cities. The jobs in the secondary 
labor market are mainly related to domestic services, which is a sector almost entirely 
reserved for women, most of which are Latin-American and Rumanian.  One also sees 
immigrants working in restaurants, but seldom Africans 15 .  In some villages in the 
borderland between the provinces of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, the immigrant population 
(per capita) is comparatively larger, since fishing and the prominent industrial activities 
mainly take place in more rural areas of the Basque Country.  The labor accessible for the 
Senegalese men within Gran Bilbao16 is thus construction and street vending.  Of those 
living in other parts of the Basque Country, low or unskilled jobs in the industrial sector 
have been available until the economic recession, but is now nearly nonexistent as the 
industry here has been severely set back due to its dependence on the luxury goods 
market (e.g. cars, etc.).  The fishery sector in the coastal towns and villages is also 
available to Senegalese immigrants in this region, and has fortunately been less affected 
by la crisis than the above mentioned sectors.  According to INE there are about 70017 
registered Senegalese immigrants in Gran Bilbao, most of which are men18, but according 
                                                 
15
 Racist reasons for this are not explicitly expressed, but with the early racialized discourse of Basque 
nationalism, it might be that the embodied experience of race and cleanliness can cause people to avoid 
hiring blacks in jobs that give them too much access to the “personal”, such as working in one’s home or 
preparing one’s food. 
16
 Gran Bilbao denotes the city of Bilbao and what were earlier close-by villages, but now part of the more 
suburban area beyond the city, though with their own small centers.  Most of Gran Bilbao is part of the 
metro system of the city. 
17
 There were 676 registered Senegalese residing in the region of Gran Bilbao in 2008 according to 
numbers by INE - Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute of Spain), elaborated by 
Ikuspegi. 
18
 89, 2% of Senegalese in the Autonomous Community  of the Basque Country are men according to INE 
and Ikuspegi, and I assume the division between the sexes are approximately the same in Bilbao. 
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to one of my informants, Ousmane (28), the number is in reality around 2000.  The 
number of Senegalese residents in the province of Bizkaia is 1860, according to 
Ikuspegi19.  If one follows Ousmane’s ratio of registered versus ‘real’ numbers, the actual 
number of Senegalese in Bizkaia is probably much higher. 
 
 
1. Map of the Basque Country in Spain; Herrixka is situated approximately half way 
between Bilbao and San Sebastián20. 
 
My informants in the Basque Country can been divided into two sub groups:  Those 
resident of Herrixka, a village in the industrial area described above. They are mostly of 
the Serer ethnic group and hail to the Sine Saloum area of Senegal.  My informants in 
Herrixka are generally members of the same social network.  The second sub group 
consists of my informants residing in Gran Bilbao. They are of various ethnicities and 
from different parts of Senegal, mostly larger cities.  They are not representatives of one 
community, like the Serer in Herrixka, but many are part of a larger extensive social 
                                                 
19
 Ikuspegi – Basque Institute of Observation of Migration: “Immigration in Bizkaia according to nationality 
and gender.  Year 2010” – Ikuspegi.  Viewed June 9, 2010: 
http://www.ikuspegi.org/documentos/tablas/castellano/2010/provinciales/bizkaia_nacionalidad_sexo20
10.pdf  
20
 Image from: http://www.eurotourism.com/es/en/map.asp?region=4&symbol=11  
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network consisting of Senegalese in the Basque Country (as opposed to a network bound 
in social relations brought with them from Senegal).  
Senegal:  A History of Movement 
The next chapter looks further into my second regional context, its experiences with 
migration, and the cultural and social structures that have developed in its wake.  Here I 
give a brief introduction of Senegal as a country of migration and the areas which I 
visited during fieldwork. 
 
In order to comprehend the structures Senegalese transnational migrants are faced with 
today it is important to look at Senegal’s place within the context of migration.  Looking 
for ‘greener pastures’ is not a new phenomenon among the people who have inhabited 
this part of West Africa; migration within this region has been common since long before 
French colonial rule laid the premises for the transnational and international migration we 
see today, and regional migration both within and beyond Senegal’s borders is still a part 
of Senegalese culture and society.  “Migration from [Senegal] is a reflection of its socio-
economic dynamics over time” (Kohnert 2007:6, cf. Tsing 2005) and must be seen in the 
context of West Africa as a whole since “migrants have always considered [this region] 
as an economic unit within which people, trade in goods and services flowed freely” 
(Addo 1975 in Adepoju 2005:27), although shaped by the processes and power structures 
intrinsic in the shaping of society at that time such as inter-ethnic warfare, slave trade, 
raiding, and the continuous struggle access vital resources like food and shelter (Adepoju 
2005:26). 
Colonialism and Gender Roles 
Under colonialism both the causes and the character of migration within West Africa, and 
thus what was to become today’s Senegal, changed through the new economic structure 
implemented by colonial rule.  For Senegal this has meant a dependence on the global 
market through cash-crop farming of groundnuts for export.  The French colonial 
administration experimented with a variety of agricultural produce in order to allow for a 
steady economic income base for their new land, eventually finding that the groundnut 
would “save the country”, seeing as few other products seemed to do well in Senegal’s 
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sandy soil.  Since then the groundnut provided “for a viable colonial economy, 
[accounting] for the great bulk (90%) of Senegal’s export value” throughout the 20th 
century (O’Brien 1975:7).  Agricultural activities today are divided into cash and 
subsistence crop farming.  Linares (1985) shows how these two production activities are 
gendered:  In the case of the Jola of the Senegalese region of Casamance subsistence 
crops like rice and palm oil reproduce existing parity in gender relations.  They are 
“social glues; substances that bind the traditional social fabric” (Linares 1985:92).  
Groundnuts, the prevalent cash crop, are associated with male productive activities and 
exclude women from agricultural production and profits in that its production is gradually 
taking over for subsistence farming.  Linares’ case shows how the ‘modernization’ and 
‘development’ of Senegalese agriculture has contributed to the embedding of the gender 
roles of provider and nurturer as articulations of tradition (see Chapter 2).  The same 
gender relations can be perceived through the phenomenon of rural-urban migration in 
the wake of colonialism in that “[male] migrants are anxious as to whether they will 
secure salaried employment in the city.  Women want to ensure that they will marry a 
man who is employed” (Lambert 2002:166).    
 
These gender roles are reproduced through other activities of production, such as 
migration, although the outcomes of this division of labor have different results.  
Migration is usually undertaken by men, but (unmarried) women have also been part of 
my group of informants in Herrixka in the Basque Country.  Ndiaye (22) is the only one 
of her six siblings that has migrated.  Her brothers are the ones who work the land at 
home in the Sine Saloum region; the women are usually not involved in agriculture.  This 
was also confirmed by my informants in Senegal:  According to Omar (47) “a woman 
should take care of the house work, the domestic chores”. 
Consolidation of the State:  Regional Migration Goes International and 
Transcontinental 
The groundwork laid by the French continued into post-colonialism from 1960 and on, all 
the while reshaping both daily life and the migration patterns of the region (Buggenhagen 
2001, Perry 2005).  With the large scale agricultural activity and plantations seasonal 
migration became the norm, while at the same time the reconfiguring of migration as a 
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concept in terms of nationality made what had been “internal” or “regional” migration 
into “international” migration (Adepoju 2005).  Colonialism, then, created not only 
artificial nation-states, but also contributed to the production of what is now 
conceptualized as ‘illegal’21 or ‘irregular’ migration, through the boundaries drawn and 
the fight for survival in a globalized local reality. 
 
The rural-urban migration within Senegal and from neighboring States to, in most cases, 
Dakar, is often part of the process of transcontinental migration.  Many young men travel 
to the big city to search for access to a migration scheme.  They might try to save up 
money for a pirogue boat voyage to the Canary Islands by selling phone cards on the 
street or work as hawkers selling tourist souvenirs, or they might pay big money to have 
someone arrange a false visa to a European country and thereby travel in a seemingly 
legal manner.  Many also attain financial support, either through loans or gifts, from 
relatives or other social contacts. 
 
The different schemes out there also grant opportunities for new types of criminal 
behavior, apart from the by now well-known pirogue route ‘business men’.   A common 
illegality is conning potential migrants into believing you have contacts within either 
Spanish or Senegalese authorities or businesses and that you thus can obtain a visa or 
work permit for them for a large sum of money.  According to my informant 
Ousseynou’s (36) brother in law, who is a high-ranked police inspector, there are enough 
of those who are willing to believe just about anything in their desperate quest for a better 
life.  For the people who get ripped off in this manner the tragedy is double; not only 
must they put their dreams on hold, but they probably now hold a huge debt both 
economically and socially to those who have contributed to them investing in migration.  
Ibou (34), my host in Dakar and a captain within the Senegalese military, confirmed that 
in some cases mothers save up money for years in order to give their son the opportunity 
to go abroad and get ahead. “If your mother gives you this gift you cannot just quit and 
go home again when times get tough”, he says, referring to the financial crisis in Spain.  
                                                 
21
 In my thesis I use the term ‘illegal’ instead of the more ‘politically correct’ ‘irregular’ to underline the 
power of legislation over my informants’ lives. 
 15 
And one can only imagine a mother’s reaction when discovering that her son has given 
away her life savings to a con artist. 
Migration: A Social Project of ‘Modernity’ in Senegal? 
‘Modernity’ is arguably a process Senegalese men and women experience as invasive, 
but also a generator of redefinitions of e.g. patterns of commodity consumption.  These 
redefinitions can lead to ‘modern’ articulations of Senegalese culture, such as migration.  
Responses towards ‘modernity’ have materialized in Senegal, as it has in other 
(post)colonial contexts.  The Muslim Sufi brotherhoods mentioned below have been one 
way of dealing with both local and global power elites (Buggenhagen 2001), and the 
uneven distribution of scarce resources.  O’Brien (1975) blames the scarcity of food the 
Senegalese have experienced since the restructuring of agriculture on Malthusian-style 
factors of population growth and land shortage, but through Buggenhagen’s (2001) 
ethnography it seems more adequate to analyze the want of resources as a problem of 
lack of distribution, in the way Vaughan (1987) shapes her argument about the Malawian 
famine of 1949.  The Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal and their inmost involvement with 
migration can be seen as a social contestation against power elites and the plights of 
‘modernity’.  
 
Migration is, on that account, a social project in the sense that it is a part of a historical 
process produced largely by colonial and postcolonial dominance.  To face the socio-
economic difficulties Senegal struggles with, much on account of this dominance, young 
Senegalese (men) go to Europe to search for the opportunities they cannot find at home 
(cf. Hernandez 2008).  Paradoxically, belonging to a former French colony can provide 
these young men with opportunities they might not have had otherwise, such as easier 
access to a visa or citizenship and cultural advantages in the form of speaking French.  
Migrations are not autonomous processes – they ‘do not just happen; they 
are produced.  And migrations do not involve just any possible 
combination of countries; they are patterned’. (Sassen 1998:56 in De 
Genova 2002:424) 
 
France was thus the most common destination for Senegalese migrants until 1985 when 
change in legislation required them to apply for a visa in order to enter.  Italy and Spain 
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have grown in popularity as destinations ever since, perhaps because these are both 
geographically and culturally close to France, and are also geographically closer to Africa 
itself.  Migration in Senegal thus has a history going back to pre-colonial times, takes a 
‘modern’ form in transcontinentality.  It is a product of the friction between global 
structures, processes and power practices on the one hand, and the sociocultural agent on 
the other (cf. Tsing 2005, Bourdieu 1977).   
Dekka and The Sine Saloum Delta 
Senegal’s Goree Island off the harbor of Dakar was an important location within the 
Atlantic slave trade that took place between the 16th and19th centuries, and Senegal’s 
coast is now the remitter of large numbers of ‘illegal’ migrants each year, heading for the 
shores of Spain’s Canary Islands.   
 
 
2. Map of Senegal with the Sine Saloum Delta just north of the border to the Gambia.22 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Map taken from: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/senegal/   
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The Fatick region, and the area of the Sine Saloum Delta where I did my rural based 
fieldwork and where many of my informants in Herrixka are from, has not been 
“considered a zone of heavy migration” (Diop 1992:57 in Perry 2009:57).  However, my 
own data indicates that this is changing, and other authors also confirm this tendency 
(Riccio 2008:219).  Seeing as both Perry’s data and statistics are from the 1990s I find it 
reasonable to assume that the so-called ‘pirogue migration’ to the Canary Islands which 
commenced in 2006, has made transcontinental migration accessible to more people.  My 
informants, both in the Basque Country and in Senegal, portrayed an image of their 
region as significant in terms of migration; ‘everyone’ knew someone who had gone 
abroad.  In combination with the continuous decline in economic affluence most of my 
informants in Senegal articulated, my data seems to imply that the migration project is 
becoming a significant part of household livelihood strategies also in the Sine Saloum 
Delta. 
 
Dekka, the base for my Senegalese village stay, is a small inland village off of the 
Saloum River.  It is dry and sandy, but people here still lives mainly of agriculture and 
fishing.  The Sine Saloum River Delta is largely inhabited by Serer people; all of my 
informants with ties to this area were of this ethnic group. 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Conceptualization of Migration: Movement and Friction between the Global, 
Local, and Individual 
In this thesis I will discuss migration as constructed in the interplay between individual 
practices and global structures of politics and economics.  On the one hand migration can 
be viewed as a way of opposing the structures people are born into, while it on the other 
can be seen as a direct result of the same structures.  I argue that migration is not a case 
of either or; it is, on an individual level, a matter of taking advantage of the opportunities 
for movement and socioeconomic advancement within each subject’s lived context, while 
it in a macro perspective is the result of a global reality of inequality when it comes to 
access to resources.  The chances to act as an agent of change within one’s own life are 
shaped on a local level through socio-cultural structures and economic realities such as 
 18 
systems of kinship and marriage, and the available opportunities to earn an income.  
These chances are thereby intrinsically bound to identity but filtered through a macro 
order of political and market institutions (cf. Tsing 2005).  The migration project is thus 
an attempt to ascend within the structures that make up different dimensions of society 
which includes building economic, social, and symbolic capital (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  
Frames the (potential) migrant can act within are not incidental, but constructed via 
market forces and historical connections of territories that define the current sets of laws 
and regulations worldwide.  These again govern the ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ status of the 
migrant, and thus his 23  justified or not justified presence in the receiving 
communities/countries (cf. Fuglerud 2001, Katz 1990). 
 
I perceive migration not as a dialectical process between nation states (Kearney 1990 in 
Riccio 2008:230, cf. Appadurai 1996), nor as a collective movement contesting global 
‘class’ differences (cf. Comaroff 2004a&b, Solé 2003).  Migration is constructed and 
construed through dynamics within different dimensions of global society today; 
dynamics that contest and intersect each other depending on the different agents 
participating in these encounters (cf. Tsing 2005, Moore 1994).  These “encounters 
across difference” (Tsing 2005:3) produce friction, and friction leads to change, though in 
unexpected and often unpredictable ways (ibid.).  Migration, as one encounter across 
difference, does not inherently contest global ‘structuring structures’ (Bourdieu 1977, 
Swartz 2002), but is a fragmented and fragmenting process produced by today’s global 
capitalist system (cf. Comaroff 2000).  This process can generate new subject positions 
while concurrently maintaining hegemonic discourses (cf. Moore 1994, Bourdieu 1977).  
Depending on the agent’s position within societal structures, and on events and processes 
taking place in these, migration as an encounter between agent and structures can have 
different results in e.g. identity construction (see Chapter 3 and 4). 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Since most of my informants who are emigrants are men I will in most cases use ‘he’ as the generic 
form when discussing migration. 
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Globalization 
Migration is both a product and a producer of the processes gathered in the concept of 
globalization.  World system theory is relevant to my case in point.  I see the world as 
connected through different layers of market relations, but also of social relations, and 
these, of course, affect each other and intertwine.  I see migration as part of the dynamics 
within the globalized economic world; a response to, rather than a revolt towards, the 
extreme inequalities that exist between the global North and the global South.  Migration 
answers to the demand of the global North’s (labor) market, while it signifies an 
important opportunity for social mobility for workers in the Southern hemisphere.  
Migration has, then, numerous dimensions. Perhaps ironically, it is a response to global 
inequalities of resource distribution, while it also shapes today’s world, continuously 
making new ‘glocal’ realities. 
 
Migration is thus arguably more a result of ‘development’ than a strategy for it.  Its 
inherent quest for prosperity is mostly on an individual or household level.  The world is 
increasingly more unified in terms of capitalist market dynamics and these create a 
hierarchy of access to affluence supported by the same discourses of ‘development’ and 
‘modernity’ (cf. Escobar 1995).  These discourses are also present in the Southern 
hemisphere through the “cultural specificity of capitalist form [that brings] capitalist 
universals into action through worldly encounters” (Tsing 2005:4).  As the global North 
‘pulls’ workers from the global South towards its increasingly stratified labor market, 
these discourses of ‘modernity’ shape agents from the global South’s imagery of and 
desire for what ‘development’ curtails (Appadurai 1998).  While ‘development’ excludes 
and includes, unifies and stratifies, local articulations of the feeling of ‘abjection’ surface 
and produce responses (Ferguson 1999).  In Senegal one such reaction has been 
migration as a strategy for socioeconomic ascent.  In this sense ‘modernity’ and 
‘development’ can be both a cause and an aim for migration. 
 
Friction shapes the discourses of global, local, and glocal realities (Tsing 2005).  The 
Senegalese migration project is part of these realities.  It appears in the discordance 
between the need for and the availability of resources seen as significant to make a ‘good 
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life’ and makes connections between agents, places, and social scapes otherwise unseen. 
Appadurai (1998:7, author’s emphasis) argues that “the consumption of the mass media 
throughout the world often provokes resistance, irony, selectivity, and in general, 
agency.”  He conceptualizes the agent in terms of the consumerism inherit in his 
modernity; as part of the “capitalist civilizing process” (ibid.).  While consumerism 
undoubtedly plays a part in my informants’ quest for the ‘good life’, I argue that 
migration is shaped as a strategy for social mobility not only through economic want and 
desires for ‘modern’ commodities, but as a response to structures of both culture and 
‘tradition’, and global socioeconomic power.  Global capitalism is thus a part of culture 
and ‘tradition’ on a local level, and ‘modernity’ is not the opposite of these (Tsing 2005).   
 
According to Bourdieu the agent is “a part of contexts of practice and […] has a history 
that makes [him/her] disposed for behaving and acting in certain ways within these given 
contexts” (Kvalsvik 1993:1224).  Habitus, as Bourdieu has named this disposition, is what 
shapes the migration project.  Intrinsic in habitus is the doxa and heterodoxa and in them 
lie the gendered subject positions and identities that are constructed via Senegalese 
culture and ‘tradition’.  When these meet the global and national structures mentioned 
above, friction may occur.  Culture thus becomes a collection of discourses within the 
global spectre of discourses on identity and the constituent rights to resources, coinciding 
and colliding, intersecting and merging, with hegemonic discourses shaped by structural 
powers of market and state interests (Tsing 2005). 
‘Tradition’ in Contemporary Senegal  
According to Hobsbawm ([1983]2002):2) tradition, both invented and not, is 
characterized by invariance.  He opposes tradition to custom, a characteristic of what he 
deems “traditional societies”:   
‘Custom’ in traditional societies has the double function of motor and fly-
wheel.  It does not preclude innovation and change up to a point, though 
evidently the requirement that it must appear compatible or even identical 
with precedent imposes substantial limitations on it.  What it does is to 
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give any desired change (or resistance to innovation) the sanction of 
precedent, social continuity and natural law as expressed in history. 
 
The tradition my informants’ spoke of thus seems more in line with Hobsbawm’s 
definition of custom, although a distinction between modern and traditional society seems 
artificial, at least in the case of Senegal.  The “invented tradition” of Hobsbawm is a 
common tool within modernization and nation building, but “custom” within Senegalese 
society is not opposed to modernity and can work much in the same way as an “invented 
tradition”.  I therefore see “custom” more as discourse in Foucaultian terms.  It is a tool 
for maintaining power structures; much like Perry (2009) describes the cooperation 
between village elders in rural Senegal and local state authorities to keep youth in check, 
punishing them with extra-legal violence (see Chapter 4).  Perry’s cases also show how 
there are always more than one discourse at work in society (Moore 1994), and what is 
deemed “tradition” depends on the power structures at hand.  When power is contested, 
e.g. in the way that gender and generational relations and identities are being renegotiated 
in Senegal, the hierarchy of discourses operating within society is challenged.  The 
results of this contestation can be a new hegemonic discourse on gender/generational 
identity, or it might just shuffle the cards and perpetuate the “custom”.  Throughout this 
thesis I will employ ‘tradition’ as an emic term describing the values and social structures 
my informants apprise as a part of the sociocultural practices they wish to preserve. 
The Structure/Agency Debate and Migration as Movement  
My informants’ narrations and comparative literature (cf. Lambert 2002) imply that the 
migration project is motivated by potential advancement within the socioeconomic 
structures of Senegalese society.  One concept of such advancement is social mobility 
which implies the existence of a class structure.  I understand class as a hybrid of 
‘bourgeois’ and Marxist theory as described by Ortner (2006).  In the case of Senegal 
class is arguably more “a set of differential positions on a scale of social advantage” than 
“inherently antagonistic” relations based on capitalism as a form of production (Ortner 
2006:22).  Senegalese migration is not a collective movement, e.g. a proletariat, 
employing migration as a revolt against the global capitalist structures, but rather a 
fragmented response to these on an individual, but socially engaged level (cf. Comaroff 
2000, Lambert 2002).  The cause of this form of migration is both the dynamics of global 
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structures and the ways that they have worked on people’s daily lives in the global South, 
and the flux of discourses within Senegalese culture, yet “classes are social categories 
that cannot be understood in terms of individual motives and desires” (Ortner 2006:26).  
The social and economical advancement desired by my informants must thus be seen in 
the context of their position within both global and Senegalese sociocultural structures. 
 
It is important to underline that the strategies for socioeconomic advancement pursued by 
my informants is related both to the stratified structures of Senegalese society and those 
of the global economy.  Europe’s history of industrialization merged with post-feudalistic 
social structures has developed a class discourse particular to its history, i.e. class in a 
Marxist perspective.  The discussion of class as a native cultural discourse within Senegal 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, but social stratification and structures of domination in 
Senegal is arguably more articulated through e.g. ethnicity or caste than on “differential 
relations to the means of production” (Ortner 2006:24, my emphasis).  
 
Throughout my thesis I will thus look at other aspects of social differentiation rather than 
class.  Differentiation produces social organization and systems, e.g. social networks, 
kinship, and gender.  Migration as a factor of Senegalese gender identity construction 
makes consideration of how identity is shaped through interpersonal relationships, e.g. in 
social networks or between gendered individuals, important (cf. Jenkins 2004). The two 
prevalent categories in terms of recruitment to organizational membership in e.g. social 
networks, are based on (1) who a person is; the innate characteristics of an individual that 
are “intersubjectively constructed […] as basic, natural or primordial”, such as age or 
gender; and (2) what he/she is, namely the characteristics bound to the “individual as an 
individual”; identifications that are “a matter of negotiation at the organisational 
boundary, and more or less competitive” (ibid. 2004:147-148).  Following this 
perspective it is mainly the (2) achieved, and not the (1) ascribed, identifications an agent 
might manipulate in order to access other spheres of the social structures he/she resides 
within, although Jenkins himself stresses the difficulty in assessing what is what of the 
human identity in that the “ins and outs of biography conspire to ensure that [they] are 
not easily disentangled” (2004:148).  It is through migration, a strategy for changing what 
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can be changed, i.e. income, that Senegalese men can aspire to achieve statuses perhaps 
otherwise unavailable.  One such important status is that of household provider, an 
expansive status in that it can increase as one provides for more people, e.g. through 
polygyny or teranga. 
 
I thus employ the concept of movement in terms of my informants’ individual desires for 
progress and change for the better for themselves and their families.  This change arises 
within local structures of household, family, and social relations which are linked to the 
dimension of discourses of expectations in terms of e.g. gender roles.  The presence of 
global capitalist discourses in the daily lives of Senegalese people contribute to the 
production of new consumption needs, while contesting important aspects of Senegalese 
‘tradition’. 
 
The embodiment of sociocultural structures and discourses is based on “[e]very 
established order[’s production of] the naturalization of its own arbitrariness” (Bourdieu 
1977:164).  In other words; “[how] we run depends on what shoes we have to run in” 
(Tsing 2005:5).  Inherit in these statements is an understanding of an agent’s access to 
capital, both material, social, cultural, and symbolical, as significant for his/her position 
in life.  This involves factors such as place of birth, sex, kin and/or cast membership (i.e. 
one’s position within the economical field in terms of e.g. relative affluence, education, 
and occupation).  Access to different sorts of capital through one’s position in a (global) 
social structure can extensively influence the need and possibility for socioeconomic 
advancement.  In a state where the public welfare system is limited people must rely on 
other systems, such as kinship and social networks.  This is a form of social capital that 
has been decisive for the Senegalese migration project. 
 
The structures around and within us do not only limit our movement, they guide it (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977).  Tsing (2005:6) compares structures to roads:  They facilitate movement 
but also confine it.  My informants have been excluded from certain structures, or roads, 
that others might take for granted, but there are some opportunities these structures make 
available, such as migration.  The road of migration holds its own confinement based on 
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local factors such as one’s position within a social network and the dynamics of cultural 
discourse.  One such discourse is that of gender identity and roles.  Within the Senegalese 
context the road of migration is far more accessible to men than to women, whose access 
to socioeconomic advancement is more available through marriage (see Chapter 4). 
 
Another important factor in terms of movement is power.  Through the doxa of a society 
its subjects will continue the internal logic of its structures.  It is when this logic is 
questioned in orthodox or heteredox practice that structural change can occur (Bourdieu 
1977:164…), as “people negotiate, bargain, violate, and compromise official rules in 
ways that reflect their interests, desires, and contingencies” (Swartz 2002:625).  From a 
Marxist viewpoint migration as a strategy for socioeconomic advancement seems to 
question the doxa of global power relations, while ‘modernity’ questions ‘traditional’ 
power relations of Senegalese sociocultural structures.  I argue that even if Senegalese 
agents act upon both global and local structures through the migration project, the 
hegemonic discourses inherit in these might still be regenerated through these practices.   
Gender and Identity 
Different discourses do not necessarily differ from the hegemonic at every turn, but can 
intersect or digress at different points (Moore 1994).  The construction of gender identity 
in Senegalese society seems to follow a certain path, but the practice of gender does not 
necessarily always follow the hegemonic discourse. 
 
Gender identities are part of the subject positions man and woman hold in the social 
structures of society.  These are shaped by different discourses on what habitus should 
consist of.  The hegemony of certain discourses, as in the Senegalese gendered subject 
positions of man as provider and woman as nurturer, does not rule out contestation, or 
the existence of other discourses (Moore 1994).  ‘Tradition’ in Senegalese society is 
articulated through my informants’ opinions on what a ‘good’ woman and man are.  As 
my data will render visible the cultural practices do not necessarily coincide with 
‘tradition’, without this leading to severe sanctions.  Pragmatism can lead to change in 
practice, although this may affect cultural discourses over time.  As young Senegalese 
men and women pursue ‘roads’ of movement, Tsing’s friction “reminds us that 
 25 
heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrangements of culture and 
power” (2005:5).  The dynamics of heterogeneous discourses that intersect, intertwine, 
and collide are susceptible to provoke change in both cultural practice and discursive 
hegemony.   
 
Methodology 
Fieldwork in the Basque Country:  Participant Observation and Interviews 
As a student of anthropology the most likely method to choose for fieldwork was 
participant observation.  One might say that this is the very foundation for 
anthropological research and should thus shape any anthropological endeavor, but “the 
method of participant-observation needs to be modified to suit each particular situation” 
(Gutkind 1974:180).  Gutkind (ibid.) argues further that even if the method of 
anthropological participant observation was developed with a small and concentrated 
field site in mind, it is pliable and can adjust to new types of studies, such as those of 
larger urban localities.  Considering a large part of my fieldwork was to be done in an 
urban setting, I decided a greater focus on verbal communication and interviews would 
be adequate, since it would be difficult to actually live with my informants.  I prepared an 
interview guide and from there proceeded on a quest to find people who would be 
interested in answering my questions.  This quest led me through social relations and 
networks.  I found this way of working adequate, as part of my interest when studying 
migration is exactly the social relations that shape and determine this phenomenon.    
 
While preparing for my fieldwork I decided that using semi-structured informal 
interviews with a prepared interview guide would be a good initial method.  Crane and 
Angrosino (1992:55) state that the “anthropologist builds up knowledge of a culture by 
asking the same questions in a variety of ways”.  This means taking part in different types 
of interaction with (potential) informants, especially what Gottlieb (2006:49) deems 
“advanced hanging out”, or participant observation. Through the experience of culture 
the answers to one’s questions are replied not only verbally, but through action and 
sensation.  Crane and Angrosino thus argue further that structured interviews are of better 
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use towards the end of the fieldwork period, when the anthropologist has gotten to know 
the culture under study (1992:58).  I however decided to commence my interaction with 
the Senegalese in the Basque Country through interviews so as to access the culture I 
aimed to experience.  Making an interview guide helped me contemplate on what the 
main focus of my research would be and I could thus explain my project to my 
informants with relevant ease.  I believe this approach was of great use both when it came 
to initiate contact and when some of my informants ‘recommended’ me on to their 
friends, family members and acquaintances:  They understood, for the most part, what 
type of work they were participating in, a fact I believe made them both trust me and also 
gave them the confidence to explain my project to others and invite them to join.  The 
‘excuse’ of doing interviews also gave the results I hoped for, namely invitations to more 
informal meetings and social gatherings. 
 
On that note it is vital to underline that finding informants was easier than imagined.  
Most were happy to help me out, and many applauded me for my interest in their lives 
and situation.  The fact that I too was a foreigner (a Norwegian in the Basque Country), 
created a common ground and I used this consciously so as to underline that I had gone 
through some of the experiences they expressed in terms of being an ‘outsider’ in 
Spanish/Basque society.  I also believe part of the willingness to participate in my project 
was because it offered my informants something to do in their daily lives, currently 
marked by unemployment and thus many moments of boredom. 
 
The interviews were a way to initiate more informal contact, and I was soon invited to 
visit some of my informants in their homes and attend different social gatherings they 
organized.  I also spent many hours sitting around in Ousmane’s shop which was a 
whole-sale establishment for street vendors, most of them Senegalese.  Consequently this 
was a great opportunity to not only meet different people of the Basque-Senegalese 
community, i.e. to ‘network’, but also to participate in their informal meetings in the shop; 
just chatting and drinking tea.  The result of my ‘interviews’ was thus opportunities to 
engage in what resembled participant observation in the classical sense. 
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Oral history has long been significant when it comes to Africa (Giles-Vernick 2006:85), 
and is a way of recording events into the collective memory.  When relying largely on 
interviews as a research method, I obtained a comparatively large amount of verbally 
transmitted data, as opposed to that ‘participatingly observed’.  The reason for my choice 
of method was tied to the urban setting I was to do the first part of my fieldwork in.  In an 
urban context one does not automatically get to know anyone unless you actively seek 
out the informants you are interested in, seeing as you are just one more of the faces of 
the city.  Getting access to a ‘Senegalese place’, such as a workplace or living quarters, 
did not seem probable and I thus decided early on that my best bet was to move through 
social networks with the ‘excuse’ of doing interviews to get to know new informants.  
My data is thus based on verbal communication, and less on situational interaction and 
random events that arise when living with people over a longer period of time.  Giles-
Vernick (2006:87) argues that  
[o]ral history methods provide a glimpse into how people of the past 
constructed their worlds – what they believed, imagined, and valuated.  
These methods can translate for readers what large, seemingly impersonal 
processes might have meant to those who participated in, contributed to, 
ignored, opposed, or even imagined them.  
 
Although she refers to methods for understanding events of the past, I argue that my 
informants’ oral accounts of their experiences serve as a sort of ‘history in the making’.  
They reflect on the “contemporary personal, social, political, and economic relations” 
(ibid. 2006:87) that shape the reality of transnational migrants today.  My methods are 
valid for uncovering the type of data necessary to embark on an analysis of this reality, 
more so, in having to choose on account of time limitations, than what a one-sited more 
‘experience’ based village study would have done.  In interviewing and interacting with a 
variety of informants, both those living abroad and in Senegal, I believe I have gotten a 
general and in-depth impression of what migration means to this group of people, a sort 
of knowledge not observable had I only partaken in daily life in a Senegalese village. 
Selection of informants 
Apart from the aspect of gender there is extensive variety in terms of my key informants 
from the Basque Country, representing different ‘categories’ of Senegalese migrants.  
One factor was the time spent in Spain; from just months to many years.  Another factor 
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was legal status; some had come ‘legally’, with a job already set up; some had arrived by 
‘illegal’ means, crossing the ocean in small fishing vessels to the Canary Islands, or 
swimming from Morocco to Melilla.  Some had obtained legal status in Spain, and some 
were still waiting.  I also interviewed both married and unmarried men, younger and 
older, from bigger cities and from rural areas.  There were those who had worked in the 
industry, in fishing and in street vending, and a couple who had their own businesses.  In 
Senegal I was able to interview families of migrants, both of those who were doing 
relatively well and those who were still struggling economically.  I find that my 
informants represent a good variety of the people that make up Senegalese reality, giving 
a broad picture of what migration means to the Senegalese through their stories. 
Fieldwork in Senegal: Village Study? 
In Senegal I was able to conduct a more ‘old school’ anthropological fieldwork, since I 
stayed with the family members of the informants I knew from my approximately four 
months spent in the Basque Country.  I was thus able to observe more of daily life and its 
routines, and perhaps be more part of the latter, even if only for a short period of time 
(and always as more of guest than a member of the community).  Yet also in this field 
site semi-structured informal interviews became an essential part as I was pressed for 
time and saw it as vital to focus on the gathering of data explicitly tied to migration. 
 
When I arrived in Dakar I had been invited to stay in the home of Adawa (26), the niece 
of Ousseynou (36), one of my main informants from the Basque Country.  Adawa lives 
with her husband, Ibou (34), in a small apartment in the very center of Dakar. This was a 
good point of departure for venturing out into the rest of the capital, which can be quite 
confusing and disorienting.  I was able to use Adawa and Ibou’s home as a base for my 
entire stay, as I visited other places where my informants from the Basque Country had 
roots.  In Dakar I also interviewed members of a family who were currently residing in 
Southern Spain. 
 
Apart from Dakar I visited my informant Boukar’s (38) family in Thies, one of Senegal’s 
larger cities, about 60 km east of the capital, before going to the Sine Saloum Delta, as 
mentioned above.  The village of Dekka, where I stayed with Ousseynou’s (36) direct 
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family headed by his older brother, became my base for day trips to other villages nearby 
and a longer trip to one of the Sine Saloum islands.  Here I interviewed both families of 
some my informants in Herrixka, and other families many who had who had a member 
abroad, either in Spain or Italy, but whose migrant member I did not know personally.  It 
turned out that many of them had connections to people I knew from the Basque Country; 
a definite door opener.  My own place in the Senegalese social network made the 
importance of social capital in this context clear; it will help you get places in life, both as 
a migrant and as a student of anthropology trying to find your way through the field. 
The Time and Depth of Participant Observation 
According to anthropological tradition the ideal fieldwork should be done over a 
significant period of time, so as to be able to observe and participate in a society during 
all its seasonal stages and observe people’s relationship with both their natural 
surroundings and socio-cultural rites bound up to these and specific dates during the year.  
Des Chene (1997:68) argues that although the theoretical face of anthropology has 
changed immensely “the model of a sojourn of at least nine months, and preferably more 
than a year, in a geographically defined field site remains standard disciplinary practice.”  
Though there is no doubt as to the importance of time in order to achieve depth in one’s 
comprehension of a field site (Gottlieb 2006:51), I believe time well spent can partly 
compensate for the lack of time lived on location.  As a master student I had a maximum 
of six months on my hands, a little more than two thirds of which were spent in the 
Basque Country and the rest in Senegal, so the holistic year-based approach fell through 
from the beginning.  I therefore needed to be focused on the topic I wanted to gather data, 
namely the experience of migration, but then be open to the additional topics that would 
reveal themselves as relevant as I proceeded, such as that of gender and generational 
identity. 
   
The essential meaning of participant observation, namely attempting to comprehend the 
‘other’ by getting an in-depth view of her or his understanding of the world (Brockington 
and Sullivan 2003:59), was ever present during my fieldwork in both field sites.  Crane 
and Angrosino’s (1992:64) description of participant observation as more “a state of 
mind, a framework for living in the field, [rather] than […] a specific program of action” 
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is adequate for my application of anthropological methodology.   This ‘state of mind’ 
made me open to changing the planned course of action of my research as I understood 
more of the Senegalese migrants’ reality, e.g. in terms of the questions asked in 
interviews and the ways in which to ask them.   
 
The use of yourself as a methodological tool makes fieldwork a very personal, even 
intimate, experience based on actions and reactions of yourself and other subjects.  I thus 
argue that even if fieldwork, with the implicit methodology of participant observation, is 
the hegemonic method in anthropology, there is more to this method than simple actions.  
Undergoing several years of anthropological studies as university students before 
undertaking our own research project, means embodying certain knowledge, and it is this 
knowledge that becomes a “state of mind” (Crane and Angrosino 1992:64) which makes 
the absorption of information such a personal experience.  This embodied knowledge also 
allows for connecting with your anthropological “state of mind” even when using more 
concrete methods for gathering information, such as interviewing in my case, or you 
work within an inadequate time limit.  Other aspects of using yourself as research tool 
will be discussed further in the following sections. 
 
Language:  Bridge and Barrier 
When conducting anthropological fieldwork one’s main tool is oneself; your personality 
and the knowledge and skills you possess.  Language is one such skill.   
 
During my fieldwork in the Basque Country Spanish was the natural choice for 
communicating with my informants, as this was the language we were most likely to 
share a common knowledge of.  The fact that this was not the mother tongue of neither 
party has made some impact on the data gathered.  I myself am fluent in Spanish and I 
usually do not have a problem expressing myself in this language, but my informants had, 
for the most part, a lower level of fluency than me, some to the extent that the interviews 
became quite short and fragmented.  This resulted in me befriending, and thus getting 
more in-depth information from, those of my informants that did speak Spanish well.  A 
factor here is that all my key informants are men; the few Senegalese women who have 
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migrated do not know as much Spanish since they have not been in Spain for long, nor 
have they, for the most part, had jobs where they mix with native speakers.  I did 
encounter a couple of exceptions from this rule, but did not manage to access into these 
girls’ social spheres25. 
Interpreter 
When it comes to my stay in Senegal, language, or rather lack thereof, as a barrier 
became painfully obvious.  French is the official administrative language and during my 
stay in Dakar I was able to get by on my school French.  As I tried to organize my trip to 
Sine Saloum I searched high and low for a decent interpreter willing to travel, that could 
translate from Serer (preferably) or Wolof, the common ‘national’ language, to either 
English or Spanish, but without luck.  Finally I left Dakar without an interpreter, hoping 
for the best.  The neighbor of my host family in Dekka, a student of Spanish at the 
University of Dakar, was home for vacation and Hassane (26) was quickly assigned the 
job as my guide and interpreter.  This arrangement glimmered with both profound 
disadvantages and numerous benefits. 
 
Hassane was halfway through his degree and without much experience actually speaking 
Spanish.  The misunderstandings and miscommunication this resulted in during our 
interview sessions was the greatest drawback of having him as a gatekeeper (Leslie and 
Storey 2003:133).  It was clear that he did not translate everything my informants said, 
and I could not be certain that he actually translated my questions to them correctly.  The 
matter did improve the more we worked together, although several interviews resulted in 
me switching to French when noticing that my informants’ answers did not coincide with 
the questions I had asked.  The latter solution worked quite well, as my informants were 
also non-native French speakers, and thus kept the vocabulary level within my reach. 
 
                                                 
25
 Since it is mostly Senegalese men who migrate, the discrepancy between male and female informants is 
representative of the reality of the Senegalese diaspora in Spain and the Basque Country.  In Senegal, on 
the other hand, I sought to interact more with women than men, but this turned out to be more difficult 
than planned because of my lack of proficiency in Serer, Wolof, and French, and because I did not manage 
to find a female interpreter. 
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Hassane’s gender was arguably another disadvantage which seems to have impacted my 
research (cf. Berreman 1962).  My contact with women was again limited by language.  
During interviews Hassane would automatically direct himself towards men, even when 
asked to concentrate on the women.  It is difficult to assess what the difference a female 
interpreter would have made, but I assume I would have obtained more in-depth data 
from women.   
 
The great advantage of working with Hassane was his intricate knowledge of, and 
friendship with, the other people from the area.  We travelled to several villages together 
and there were social relations to move through at every turn.  Had he not been my guide, 
I could not have obtained so many interviews in such a short period of time, both because 
I would not know where to start (i.e. which households had family members abroad), nor 
would my questions probably have been so easily accepted and answered.  Again I 
experienced the importance of social networks in Senegal. 
 
Ethics and Anonymity 
Teranga and Transparency:  Expectations of Reciprocity 
I believe the openness I was met with during fieldwork is largely due to how important 
Senegalese hospitality, or teranga, is considered to be within Senegalese society (see 
Chapter 4).  But there might also have been other reasons that have made it easier for my 
informants to welcome me into their lives. 
 
While in the field I moved through social relations, meeting new informants via those I 
had already gotten to know.  Senegalese in general are quite concerned with maintaining 
good relations with their peers; it is important to greet everyone, ask about the family, etc.   
I perceive the social network of a Senegalese individual, both abroad and at home, to 
functions as social capital both for the person in question and her/his immediate social 
ties (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  To treat people well and help someone who needs it purports a 
better chance that you, or your children, will be treated well and helped out in a time of 
need. 
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Teranga also applies to the way you are supposed to treat strangers, and so by being met 
with this genuine openness I have also entered into a circle of reciprocity, a circle which 
will outlast me.  This of course raises ethical questions in terms of anthropological 
fieldwork practice.  According to Curran (2006) transparency is the bottom line when it 
comes to deeming a research project ethical.  This involves respect for the research 
subjects, recognizing that they can only take part in the research project based on their 
own free will and with sufficient information on “the consequences of the research to 
evaluate their decision to participate” (Curran 2006:202).  This is seems straight forward, 
but becomes complicated when, as an anthropologist, your research should be based 
largely on personal interaction with your informants; befriending them, to call a spade a 
spade.  When getting to know new people, and especially people of an unfamiliar culture, 
it is difficult to assess how the other person perceives the content and consequences of 
your relationship.   
 
Even if payment for information does not seem expected, getting involved in a social 
network means (potentially) participating in chains of reciprocity.  Payment for 
information can be seen to jeopardize the veracity of informants’ accounts; if information 
is paid for it is more probable that the person giving the information will shape it into 
what she/he believes the researcher wants to hear, and the voluntarism of a subject can be 
put into question if conditions of “coercion or undue influence” are involved (Curran 
2006:203).  It is especially ‘undue influence’ that can be problematic during 
anthropological fieldwork.  The mere presence of the anthropologist often implies 
imbalanced power relations between researcher and subject.  In terms of my own 
fieldwork my presence and involvement seemed to invocate certain hopes for the future 
for many of my informants, even if payment for information was not a factor. 
 
These power relations imply numerous reasons for why an informant would be eager to 
please the researcher, both when it comes agreeing to be an informant and to the type of 
information given, although “the relationship between an anthropologist and his 
informants ought to be transactional.  In exchange for information the anthropologist 
offers ‘confirming behaviour’” (Brunt 1974:311).  It can be difficult to decide what this 
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transactional relationship should consist of, when it is apparent that your informants 
might have expectations of an exchange of concrete favors and you know this might 
influence the information given.  My informants in the Basque Country focused 
somewhat on their troubles, which I perceived as an intent of assimilation to the public 
refugee discourse, so as to be understood as in league with those in need, and thus those 
‘deserving’ of residency in Europe (see Chapter 3).  Also needs for assistance in finding 
employment were sometimes implied. In Senegal I was asked both directly and indirectly 
by informants whether I could help them migrate to Spain.  
Safety Considerations 
The anthropological endeavor requires using yourself as a research tool and thus 
potentially putting yourself at risk.  One’s personality and (gender) identity become 
intrinsic parts of your research and impact the data gathered. 
 
One aspect of being a female researcher is the possible amorous interest of men.  To 
mark my status as a ‘taken’ woman I made it known early on that I was in a relationship.  
In Senegal I sometimes resorted to being ‘married’, and for the most part to ‘having a 
fiancé’, even though that was also due to my lack of French vocabulary to describe my 
status.  Although I do believe it was an advantage to be considered a ‘taken’ woman, men 
were generally respectful.  Having a ‘husband’ also made it easier when communicating 
with women since I am in the proper age to be married and hence we could relate through 
our statuses as ‘wives’.   
 
As of general safety, Senegal is a relatively calm and peaceful place compared to other 
African countries, and when avoiding obvious high-risk situations such as walking alone 
at night I usually felt safe.  There are, however, instances in which being too cautious will 
limit your research extensively.  The mere fact of being a woman and alone in a new 
place makes you a potential victim of uncomfortable or even dangerous situations 
(Nowak and H. and R. Scheyvens 2003:165), but not taking any risks when becoming 
acquainted with potential informants will eventually isolate you from those you are 
supposed to get to know.  I found that following my ‘instincts’, both in the Basque 
Country and in Senegal worked well, and did not experience anything more than 
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‘uncomfortable’ situations.  Having a social network to move through was an important 
part of being safe, both in terms of not being alone in new places, and in terms of ‘social 
control’; when you know many people, there are many people paying attention to what is 
happening to you, and thus looking out for you. 
Anonymity of People and Places 
I have given pseudonyms to both people and places.  Both Dekka and Herrixka are 
pseudonyms, although I have given their approximate locations in order to place my 
fieldwork site into its relevant context of livelihood strategies and, in Dekka’s case, 
ethnicity.  The other villages I visited in Senegal shall remain nameless since they lie 
close to Dekka and are similar in terms of income strategies.  In do name Bilbao, as it is a 
city with a fairly large Senegalese population, and my informants here thus have small 
chances of being recognized through my text.  When choosing pseudonyms for my 
informants I have used random Senegalese names that do not represent the actual names 
of any of them.  Combining pseudonyms of both people and places make my informants 
as untraceable as possible without breaking stories away from individuals, although out 
of principle I do not reveal information that I believe can harm them in any foreseeable 
way. 
 
Thesis Outline 
This Introduction chapter has introduced my problem approaches, field sites, theoretical 
perspectives, methodology, and ethical considerations.  In Chapter 2 I will discuss 
migration as a Senegalese project for movement throughout national history, and how this 
movement is embedded in social relations of reciprocity (Mauss 1995).  Chapter 3 
discusses the structural dynamics and global events affecting the Senegalese migration 
project, with particular attention to the current economic recession.  I argue that such 
structures create particular patterns, or paths, of migration, and are also present in the (re-) 
production of Senegalese identity (cf. Tsing 2005, Moore 1994).   In Chapter 4 I discuss 
migration in light of cultural practices and discourses of gender relations and identity, 
showing how the practice and production of (gender) identity has implications for how an 
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agent’s strategy for socioeconomic ascent is constructed and undertaken.  I will also 
consider the conflicts of ‘tradition’ versus ‘modernity’ visible through the articulations of 
different discourse dimensions in Senegalese culture today.  Finally, Chapter 5 discusses 
the implications of the global recession on Senegalese lives, contemplating the future fate 
of the Senegalese migration project. 
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Chapter 2:   
 
Senegal:  Remitter of Migrants and Receiver of 
Remittances  
 
 
Modernization […] has changed the customs we had before.  We have 
taken some of the Western customs.  And, well, there is always something 
bad about it that affects the people. […] We thought that everything 
coming from our tradition is bad and that everything coming from the 
West is good.  We cannot continue like this.  Now the people are beginning 
to see that we have left some things behind that are much better than 
Western things.  But now we cannot force people [to change back]. 
 
        Ousseynou (36) 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will set the stage by more extensively conceptualizing Senegalese 
migration experiences over time.  As shown in Chapter 1, Senegal’s history of migration 
is extensive as nomadic, regional, and rural-urban circular migration has been a part of 
society for centuries.  Senegal’s interconnection with the global market, first through 
slavery and colonization, and then through ‘globalization’, has produced friction between 
‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ discourses and practices.  This comes to show in e.g. the 
‘allure of commodities’, intergenerational conflict, and gendered strategies for 
socioeconomic advancement such as migration and marriage (cf. Lambert 2002, Perry 
2009).  I argue that such factors render the sociacultural embeddedness of economically 
motivated agency visible in the reciprocal relationships between the migrant and his 
family.  The same relationships supports the perception of commodities as gifts, as the 
‘modern’ ‘allure’ informs the transcontinental household’s strategies for socioeconomic 
advancement and (re-)production (cf. Mauss 1995). 
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‘Modern’ Senegal and its History of Migration 
Social Structures and Systems of Meaning 
Migration is more than just a rational economic action on a micro level as anthropologists 
before the 1970s reduced it to.  Since then there was a rising recognition of the fact that 
migration did not fit into classic modernization theory (Kearney (1986:336).  Lambert 
(2002), in his monography on the Jola of Casamance, shows that Senegalese migration is 
about much more than economic gain, in that  
through their mobility, the peoples of West Africa have long been crossing 
boundaries, redefining their communities, and imbuing the spaces into 
which they move with new meanings.  The peoples of West Africa have 
been speaking with their feet. (2002:xxii)   
 
Lambert has studied regional migration within Senegal, but it is reasonable to speak of 
Senegalese transnational migration in the same terms. The communal connections 
Lambert suggests extend through time and space, even when part of the community 
moves to a different continent, imbuing Senegalese migration in general with a sense of 
circularity (Riccio 2008:218-219).  Nonetheless, it is important not to disregard the ideas 
of modernization when it comes to understanding migration. This is not because 
migration necessarily is a quest for ‘modernity’, but because ‘modernity’ is already part 
of the daily lives of people all around the globe.  The allure of commodities have become 
embedded in people’s lives, and the desire for these, and a way of life which can assure 
access to them, drive Senegalese to e.g. migration, linking local lives to “supra-local 
events and processes” (Lambert 2002:167).  Thus, instead of “resisting 
proletarianization” (ibid.), people in Senegal strive to become a part of ‘modern’ life and 
the capitalist market, regarded as a way to progress and prosper.  The stories of my 
informants exemplifies one way in which “universals and particulars come together to 
create the forms of capitalism with which we live” (Tsing 2005:4).  While the “cultural 
specificity of capitalist form arises from the necessity of bringing capitalist universals 
into action through worldly encounters” (ibid.), “migration [becomes] the legacy that 
demonstrates the power of commodities” (Lambert 2002:166).  Thus, Senegalese 
perceive the world in terms of how their lives play out within the opportunities available 
to them.  The structures that hold, or lack, these opportunities are bound by larger 
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structures on a national, regional and global scale and the Senegalese migrants and their 
families are not unaware of this.     
 
 
3. Construction project in 'modern' Senegal (Dakar). 
 
To migrate is then to take a specific form of action in order to overcome certain obstacles 
that these structures hold in an attempt to fulfill locally conceptualized (gender) roles 
through global strategies for socioeconomic advancement, e.g. the man’s role as 
household provider (see Chapter 4).  For most of my informants I would claim that they 
portray their sociality as ‘belonging to’ Senegalese, more than Spanish or Basque, society.  
One of the reasons for this might be that an eventual return to Senegal is one of the 
primary reasons for why they migrate in the first place (cf. Riccio 2008)26.  Migration 
does not mean leaving the structures of their society behind; it is another form of 
responding to them rather than ‘sitting and waiting’ conceived by many as the alternative.  
                                                 
26
 Although this return might not happen, judging by the experiences of other diasporas. 
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Migration becomes a sort of continuum of Senegalese culture through the migrant’s role 
as a provider for the household he belongs to.  But migration also means meeting new 
structures; those of Spanish/Basque society.  In as pointed out in Chapter 3 these 
structures can be difficult to access, and the migrants tend to reproduce Senegalese 
sociality rather than adopting new cultural ways.  Migration thus represents a “shared 
system of meaning, a process that goes beyond the mere movement of people to 
encompass identity, status, and understandings of place” (Lambert 2002:xxvi).  This 
system of meaning affects the identity construction of both the migrant himself and those 
back home.  Migration thus produces connections between different systems of meaning, 
and generates new meanings in already existing structures, such as the social organization 
and gender relations (cf. Riccio 2008).  In the next subsection I consider how migration 
can generate both economical and social capital.  This capital arguably connects families 
to the systems of meanings discussed above. 
Migration: A Family Livelihood Strategy  
Regional and circular migration is still very much part of Senegalese life, but is now 
performed more in the rural-urban context (cf. Lambert 2002).  Most families from rural 
regions have members who live in Dakar or other urban centers.  The principle of 
remittance contribution to those at home is an important part of this, and can be 
considered the basis for what has expanded into transnational and transcontinental 
migration.  One’s place within kinship and social networks are affirmed and nurtured 
through remittances (Jenkins 2004:149), as the migrant plays out his role of provider (see 
Chapter 3).  Or as one informant in Bilbao, Masseck (27), articulated it:  “You are where 
you are from. […] If you don’t help you turn your back. […] You lose ‘the thread’”. 
 
In general my informants seemed very committed to their places of origin, even those 
who had lived their whole life in Dakar, but whose family was originally from another 
part of Senegal.  “In Dakar everyone is an immigrant”, according to Ousmane (28), one 
informant in Bilbao, originally from Touba.  Even if people work in Dakar most of the 
year, only to go back to their village during vacations, they still consider the village their 
home to the extent of regarding it as their place of residence.  Diama, Ousseynou’s 
younger sister works the whole year in Dakar as a hairdresser and only goes back to 
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Dekka in summer, for Tabaski, and for Christmas vacations.  Still, when I asked her 
where she lives (meaning where in Dakar), she said “I live here, in Dekka”.  Diama says 
she just travels to Dakar to work, since there are few available economic activities in the 
Sine Saloum region, especially for women, but she likes Dekka so much more; “life here 
is simple.”   
 
The transnational migrant’s relationship to his homestead is also clear in that he shapes 
his professional life in the Basque Country and Spain around his ability to visit Senegal 
as often as possible (cf. Riccio 2008).  Temporary contracts are common among 
Senegalese immigrants so that he can have longer vacations in Senegal than allowed 
through a permanent contract.  This has made great impact on their situation once the 
economic crisis hit (see Chapter 3 and 5).  So for the Senegalese, it seems, home is 
definitely where the heart is and they are willing to go to great lengths in order to 
maintain their circular relationship with those in their country of origin.   
 
Although transcontinental migration27  is of more recent character than migration within 
West Africa, it is intrinsically intertwined with Senegal’s colonial history.  Perry (2005) 
shows how both post-independence economic reforms of collective agriculture and neo-
liberal reform in the 1980s through Structural Adjustment Programs funded by IMF and 
the World Bank has shaped family, religious, and gender relations, while Buggenhagen 
(2001) shows how migration also plays a part in these relations in that remittances shape 
the social realities of those at home. 
 
According to Tall (2005:156) in “some villages in the region of Louga, remittances sent 
by international migrants account for 90% of household incomes, and an implicit contract 
links each migrant to his family.”  At the same time estimates of Eurostat (2001) hold 
that international remittances account for 30 to 70% of the Senegalese household budget, 
and that most Senegalese families include a migrant (Cotula et al. 2004:33).  Senegalese 
                                                 
27
 Senegal’s borders have been re-negotiated on several occasions, so to speak of transnationality in this 
context seems a bit imprecise seeing as from one year to the next the same migrants could be thought of 
as “internal” or rural-to-urban instead of transnational, depending on the current state borders. 
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transcontinental migration is then a social project not only through its link to historical 
processes and religion, but also through economy and family life.  Migration from 
Senegal is not only a response to a young man’s hopes for the future, but a part of his 
family’s livelihood strategy (Cotula et. al 2004, Hernández 2008), where the economic 
capital he is expected to remit will provide his family with a more stable household 
economy.  
Migration Generates Social, Symbolical, and Cultural Capital 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 my data indicates that migrants’ remittances are an important 
source of income also in the Sine Saloum area, although the amounts received seem to 
vary extensively.  Most use this extra income as a source for subsistence, while a relative 
few have the chance to actually save up and better their living standard substantially, 
depending on how much ‘their’ emigrant is earning, how many emigrants there are in the 
family, and, of course, how much those abroad choose to send back home.  Migration is 
hence an investment in family welfare, a large part funded by the migrant’s social 
network, providing the resources for this costly project.  
 
The migrant therefore “[tends] to follow paths shaped by social, kinship and religious 
networks” (Riccio 2008:220), as he arguably needs both economic and social capital to 
back him.  The network this capital is drawn from includes members in both Senegal and 
abroad, and the migrant himself thus becomes a potential future resource for other 
aspiring migrants once he has undertaken his own project (cf. Lambert 2002).  Being a 
migrant thus holds social value in itself, and having a migrant in the family is not only a 
basis for economic security but also an investment in social and symbolic capital as it 
raises the household’s ‘value’ in terms of connections abroad (cf. Bourdieu 1977) (see 
Chapter 5).   
 
Visible in my data is, as argued, the importance of social networks.  Most of my 
informants have moved through these in order to reach Spain.  In this sense the migrant 
himself is a resource:  Once he is abroad he generates not only economical capital, but 
also cultural, social, and symbolical.  He symbolizes his family’s connection to the 
‘modern’ world; he is a resource for those at home who wish to migrate through his 
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(assumed established) position within Spanish society.  He symbolizes not only monetary 
wealth, but social success.  The pride articulated by many of the migrants’ family 
members in Senegal argues for an understanding of migration’s significance in terms of 
increase in prestige and status for the migrant and his family (see Chapter 4 and 5). 
Remittance and Social Obligations: “Taking Care of my Family” 
 
 
4. One place to receive remittance transfers from Europe in the Sine Saloum area. 
 
The involvement of family and social relations in the migratory project has, then, a 
double edge. 
[The] extended family and household display ambivalent characteristics: 
on the one hand they represent the most important source of never-ending 
special obligations; on the other they provide migrants with important 
status recognition. (Riccio 2008:221) 
  
Or as Masseck (27) expressed it: “If you come to Europe you are a businessman without 
money,” in that having an income signifies sharing it with those at home, meaning you do 
not actually make much.  The remittances the migrant contributes can make him a 
contemporary hero and a symbol of ‘modern’ society, sung of in songs of famous 
Senegalese musicians such as Yossou N’Dour and Ismael Lo.  Remittances are regarded 
as “a fundamental symbol of the emigrant’s loyalty towards their non-migrant family” 
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(Riccio 2008:225), binding the household together in a social project across the 
transnationality that divides it.  The migrant is never alone – the family structure 
constitutes a grand support network with inherent obligations of reciprocation.  
Expectations and aspirations regarding Senegalese transcontinental migration are thus 
bound to the different social scapes mentioned above (cf. Appadurai 1996); history, 
religion, and gender and family/household relations. 
 
The Push and the Pull within Senegalese Discourses on Migration 
To understand migration is to understand the migrant as a part of a socio-cultural system 
that is bound to today’s globalized world.  He is not solely a rational ‘homo economicus’, 
“responding to spatial unevenness in labor markets, moving to where [he can] obtain 
higher wages” (Kearney 1986:334).  He is more than a worker and consumer in the 
economic sense of these labels; a social being that bases his decisions on the values that 
have shaped his upbringing and that he sees fit to shape his future (cf. Bloch & Parry 
1989).  These values are, of course, linked to economics, in the sense that access to 
resources is a basic condition for life anywhere in the world.  It is when this access is 
lacking, thus limiting one’s connection to a life that bears meaning that migration can 
become an option as is the case in Senegal.  Furthermore, the migrant is not only part of 
the society he leaves behind but he also becomes a member of the society he encounters 
where he arrives, creating a transnational connection between his homeland and his new 
place of residence.  To what extent does the new place of residence bear meaning for the 
migrant in terms of socioeconomic progress?  How does Spanish society and culture 
influence his project?  And how does this connect with the production and 
conceptualization of the Senegalese masculine identity and gender role?  These are 
central processes discussed in the next chapters. 
 
 Motivations and Aspirations at Home and Abroad 
It arguably takes strong convictions to embark on any journey as perilous as migration 
can be, as in the example of ‘pirogue’ boat migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands 
(Hernandez 2008).  Within migration theory it has been common to categorize such 
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persuasion into ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.  This model hails from neoclassical theory and 
applies economic argumentation where the mechanisms of supply and demand are those 
relevant.  Within anthropology this analysis becomes too simplistic and rigid, as the 
‘factors’ addressed are always embedded in systems of meaning and power, and thus 
need to be elaborated.  The ambiguity of such ‘factors’ is visible in e.g. King’s (1993) 
claims that the economic want and political instability in the country of origin can be 
considered push factors, while Kohnert (2007:7) views economic want as a pull factor in 
the sense that the host countries of Europe are imagined as a sort of El Dorado, alluring 
and auspicious.  Push-pull theory is thus “rather mechanical and there is little room left 
for the study of the ‘intervening obstacles’ […] and institutional, structures and 
interactional considerations that make the study of migration so subtle and so rewarding” 
(Cohen 1996:xv).   
 
I consider migration to be about numerous intersecting processes from within all 
dimensions of life, producing circular, converging, and crisscrossing movement 
comparable to the process of discourse production as described by Moore (1994) (cf. 
Tsing 2005).  Although many of my informants’ reasons for migrating share certain 
characteristics, each story of how this happened is unique and can thus not be understood 
schematically.  I thus find it more interesting to look at the interplay between “individual 
motivation and structural causation” (Cohen 1996:xii), with emphasis on how these are 
part of one another through ‘structuring structures’ and the agent’s embodiment of and 
action upon these through the doxa and heterodoxa of his sociocultural reality (Bourdieu 
1977).  Economic behavior is thus more than the transaction of resources; it is embedded 
in a reciprocal relationship with sociocultural practices and discourses (cf. Lambert 2002, 
Fagertun 2009), while the concept of friction depicts how different dynamics of social 
interaction and global processes meet and create change (cf. Tsing 2005). 
The Desire for a Better Life 
It is clear that the lack of opportunity to escalate financially is an important factor when it 
comes to leaving Senegal behind; all of my informants in the Basque Country focus 
mainly on money and economic issues when asked why they decided to go.  It is both the 
lack of resources at home and the fantasy of abundantly available resources abroad that 
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make migration attractive; not only for those who go, but for those who hopefully 
receives remittances when their family members ‘strike gold’ abroad (cf. Riccio 2008).   
 
As mentioned it is widely argued within migration literature that migration is a social 
project, a family decision (i.e. Cotula et al. 2004, Tall 2005, Riccio 2008).  “Migration in 
general is in many African contexts as much a family as an individual strategy to 
minimise the risks of unstable income” (Massey et al. 1998 & Tacoli 2001 in Hernández 
2008:43).  This is also true regarding Senegalese migration, but this decision does not 
seem to be ‘explicitly’ collective.  It is articulated on an individual level as a choice, 
through the migrant’s ideas and practices of responsibility and reciprocity towards his 
family.  My informants rarely admitted to any pressure or force when it comes to sending 
remittances to their families; it is voluntary, it is why they came (cf. Mauss 1995).  This 
commitment to those at home is also part of the migrant’s decision to stay put, even now 
when the Spanish state is in decline economically and politically28. 
 
In the case of Khadim (29), a resident of Bilbao for almost seven years, there does not 
seem to be a specific event that drove him to migrate; he simply ceased an opportunity to 
embark on a life path he deemed more hopeful than the one he left behind.  Khadim 
attained a tourist visa to go visit his uncle, who had lived years in Bilbao and had even 
brought his family to live with him, and then overstayed it.  He has not been able to 
become ‘legal’ since he was arrested for selling ‘pirate’ CDs and DVDs as a street vendor.  
This meant that he was not allowed to apply for a residence permit until five years had 
passed and now with the economic crisis he cannot find a job and thus not apply for his 
residence permit. 
 
His life is tough, Khadim says.  He looks slightly disheveled and his clothes are worn.  
When I met him it was the beginning of Ramadan and he said he was tired and hungry 
because of that.  But, he adds, he does not eat very much in general.  He now works 
                                                 
28
 Political decline when it comes to immigrants due to the reforms done in Spanish law to make 
immigration more difficult, and the daily life of immigrants also so. 
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selling belts and purses in the streets, seeing as he is in between jobs.  He has been able to 
hold black market jobs within construction these past years, but now times are difficult.   
 
I asked him what he thinks of his situation and his future.  He said that it is difficult here 
without his family, but that he will keep on going.  He is still young and he will see if 
things change.  It is not an option to go home.  He said that back home nothing ever 
changes.  There the situation is unbearable, both for his family and people in general.  He 
manages to send a little bit of money each month, but it is difficult.  He tries to see things 
positively; there are people who are worse off than him.  Some die here and some are sent 
back.  In the place where everyone wants to go it is difficult to get ahead, but you have to 
keep trying.  He says that things change all the time; “whatever you thought would be 
never arrives.  You need to have an idea and keep trying; you cannot change your idea 
even if things are difficult, or even if they are not!” 
 
Khadim reproduces the dominant migrant discourse of sacrifice for one’s family, yet, it 
also appears as though his sacrifice has as much to do with his own future as his family’s.  
He does not feel he has anything to go back to; his family needs him and he cannot 
provide anything for them if he goes back home.  Even if his situation in Bilbao leaves 
much to be desired he holds on (particularly to his religion). 
 
Seydhi’s (32) reasons for leaving Senegal seem more apparent; perhaps it is possible to 
say that he was ‘pushed’ to a certain extent.  He comes from a village in the Sine Saloum 
Delta, where much economic activity revolves around the river.  In Seydhi’s case this 
meant working within transport; bringing people up and down the river in a ‘pirogue’ 
boat.  He told me that in general his life had been nice and tranquil, apart from one 
particular year:  He was working with the boat transportation and had vague plans of 
going to Saudi Arabia to study since two of his cousins worked there.  One day a man 
came to him and asked him to take his money and, during his route with the boat, buy a 
big load of shrimp that this man would sell later in the villages and make a big profit.  
Seydhi agreed to this, took the man’s money and bought him the shrimp.  “But when you 
transport seafood you need a way of maintaining the produce cool; you need a lot of ice, 
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especially in Senegal where it is so hot, because shrimps turn bad very quickly in the 
heat,” Seydhi explained to me.  And, as it turns out, he did not have enough ice in the 
boat to maintain the right temperature; the shrimps were rotten on arrival.  Seydhi 
suddenly owed a lot of money.  The man who had given him the money threatened to 
send him to jail.  He finally decided to sell the house of his father, who had passed away 
when he was only a child, although this was not an easy task seeing as his sister also had 
legal rights to it.  His cousin was the owner of the boat he was using for his transportation 
business and the bad year ended with him taking the boat back.  Seydhi now stood 
without a job and with severed relations to several individuals within his social network.  
That is when he decided to leave; first to Mauritania to work as a fisherman, and later to 
Spain. 
 
A focus on solely economical aspects of migration, through e.g. ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, 
arguably renders the migrant helpless; he is either pushed or pulled; without subjectivity, 
nor agency.  The degree of agency through migration can be discussed infinitely.  Does 
the migrant oppose the structures that hold him back?  Or does he simply take advantage 
of the loopholes within that structure?  Is migration yet another piece of the global 
political economy’s puzzle that drives people away from their home in order to be 
exploited as workers in another geographical place of this system where the market 
forces need them?  Are my informants ‘victims’ of global socioeconomic power 
structures with implicit discourses of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’, or are they agents 
shaping their own destiny through the manipulation of structural processes? 
 
Chapter Conclusions 
So far I have argued that transcontinental migration as a strategy for socioeconomic 
ascent has taken shape through global encounters over time (cf. Tsing 2005).  Through 
Senegal’s history as an important West African port for Atlantic trade and as a colony of 
France, certain paths of migration have become more probable than others.  Migration 
has also been a strategy for socioeconomic advancement within Senegal and West Africa, 
creating circular movement and reciprocal interconnections between rural villages and 
urban centers (cf. Lambert 2002).  By presenting cases from my empirical data I have 
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substantiated this argument showing how my informants’ attachment to their place of 
origin, both to Senegal as a country and to more specific regional locations, shape their 
migration projects in that their place within this society is a primary factor in the decision 
of departing.  The connections within migrant’s social and kinship network serve as both 
a resource for being able to undertake this strategy and as the receiver of his remittances, 
thus regenerating social ties between the migrant and those at home.  The migration 
project arguably implicates that social, cultural, and symbolic capital is generated for the 
migrant himself and for individuals within his social network in that he as an individual 
becomes an important resource of economic and social capital (for potential future 
migrants).  Through the patterns in my informants’ narrations and my discussion of 
neoclassical migration theory of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors I have shown that Senegalese 
migration is imbued with circularity and reciprocity and that this strategy for social 
migration is embedded in socioeconomic practices in the country of origin (cf. Mauss 
1995, Fagertun 2009).  In Chapter 3 I present how Spain as the receiver of migration and 
an advocate of ‘Western’ discourses on migration holds particular structures that both 
allow for and challenge the Senegalese migration project. 
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Chapter 3: 
Structural Challenges in Spain and Beyond 
 
‘They look askance at you; you are not from here.’ 
 
Masseck (27),  
quoting a song about 
migrants by Youssou 
N’dour 
 
We cannot do anything without that piece of paper.  That small, yet big, 
piece of paper. […] Here there are many [social] relations, but what 
happens is that people can help you a lot with some things, but the matter 
of ‘papers’ is a matter of the Spanish administration. 
 
       Ousseynou (36) 
 
 
Introduction 
Previously I have shown how the migration project is shaped in light of socio-cultural 
and economical structures of Senegalese society influenced by global structures and 
processes beyond its borders.  The focus of this chapter is on how national policies of the 
Spanish state, influenced by global discourses and events such as the economic crisis, 
influence this project.  I argue that the Senegalese migration project is intrinsically bound 
to global structures, not only in the sense that they might be motivated by global 
discourses of ‘modernity’ (see Chapter 2), but in how these structures shape the possible 
routes to prosperity.  These routes work for some, but compromise others, perhaps to the 
extent of them reconsidering their chosen strategy.  The success of one’s strategy can also 
affect your ability to fill your role as provider, and thus the construction of manhood and 
self (see Chapter 4). 
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Migration and the State:  Migrants as the New Nomads? 
Transnational migration connects two (or more) states through individuals (cf. Hannerz 
1996).  These individuals’ access to their new place of residence is shaped by both 
national and international politics and law, according to which state is one’s origin and 
which state is one’s destination.  In terms of destination, one’s point of departure, 
especially in terms of nationality, plays a major role in where you might choose to go.  
Fuglerud (2001:29) refers to Marx in saying that people make history, although not under 
the circumstances they themselves have chosen.  Bourdieu’s concept of “structuring 
structures” also depicts the way in which my informants are positioned within both local 
and global power relations (cf. Swartz 2002).  Senegal’s history and geographical 
location have developed into certain types of migration trajectories, as have the societal 
structures that are a result of these processes.  As many Senegalese regard their access to 
movement and socioeconomic advancement as limited within local structures, one 
tempting option is ascending within these structures by moving away from them through 
migration.  Masseck (27), resident of Bilbao and frustrated with Senegalese, Spanish, and 
international politics, described the situation in Senegal as follows:  
In Senegal there is no middle class.  Without money you are nothing.  You 
are not a part of society.  If you get sick you don’t get treatment, if your 
house is on fire you call the firefighters and they first ask you for money 
for gasoline for the truck before they come; your house will have burned 
down before they get there.  If you call for an ambulance it might take an 
hour before they come; you’ll get sooner to the hospital if you take the bus. 
[…]  The president sells his politics to the West.  He says: ‘Send us our 
migrants back; they are needed here for work.’  But this is not true.  There 
is no work. 
 
Migration is thus a result of, and a way of dealing with, global structures and 
processes embedded in state politics and sociocultural practices (cf. Tsing 2005).  
Different intersecting encounters between these factors are presented below. 
The ‘Deserving Poor’ and the Discourse of Refuge 
The international concern for refugees since World War II has shaped the way the 
different nation states regard and treat non-citizens.  A juridical distinction is made 
between people from places that have yet to experience open conflict, but e.g. have an 
extensive discrepancy between different segments of the population when it comes to 
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access to power and resources, and individuals from e.g. war zones.  Although the 
reasons for war might be the similar to what those from non-war areas are experiencing, 
the legal difference between refugee and labor migrant is drawn along these lines; the 
former more deserving of ‘assistance’, i.e. rights, than the latter (Fuglerud 2001). The 
“degree of voluntariness involved in a persons movement from one country to another, 
will often have consequences for this person’s rights in terms of national and 
international law” (ibid. 2001:2929), meaning whether or not a person is deemed a refugee 
by international standards can decide whether or not he/she gets residency and on what 
terms. 
 
Through my fieldwork I became aware of how this international discourse on refugees 
shapes the way people in general conceive migration and migrants.  The concept of “the 
deserving” versus “the undeserving poor” developed in late 18th and early 19th century 
Europe and North America (Katz 1990).  The distinction between the two categories was 
based on two important characteristics; whether or not you were “able-bodied” and 
whether you were a resident or a stranger.  The “impotent poor” were those who were 
deserving of aid because they were unable to work due to e.g. health problems, and the 
immediately responsible for aiding the poor were the local social networks and 
communities, making the issue of settlement important.  As migration became more 
common since people kept moving in search of work, it became increasingly more 
difficult for the authorities to rely on the local communities to lend a hand to the poor, 
since nobody really knew where they belonged.   
 
The connection between the way poor have been and are viewed and the way migrants 
are categorized seems apparent. When it comes to ‘deserving’, refugees are deemed 
worthy of the West’s ‘help’, while labor migrants, who are considered to be coming from 
places without armed conflict or persecution, i.e. ‘non-problematic’ countries, are 
normally only accepted as residents when and where there is a need for them in the 
niches rendered adequate for an immigrant labor force.  This discourse of the ‘needy’ vs. 
the ‘able-bodied’ seems general in most European states in terms of how immigrants are 
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 My translation from Norwegian. 
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greeted and treated.  One example is the Norwegian government’s proclaimed restriction 
of asylum politics starting in 200830.  The rhetoric was clear:  Those who did not have a 
“real need of protection” were not welcome in Norway.  Fuglerud (2001:32) puts it this 
way:  “An unfortunate distinctive feature of the public debate on immigration is that it is 
done on the premises of internal politics and reflects only to a small degree the 
complexity of the places refugees and immigrants come from”.  From a Marxist point of 
view migration can be seen as an effort to contest the current global distribution of wealth.  
I draw a parallel to the Comaroffs (cf. 2004a&b) who show how crime can be perceived 
as “a means of […] productive redistribution” (ibid. 2004a:806) within the South African 
state.  However, to regard migration as a revolt against ‘class’ structures would be 
misleading in terms of my empirical data. 
 
 
5. "From this door for a journey without return they parted, their eyes fixed on infinite suffering."  Sign 
from museum of Isle de Goré off the port of Dakar, where thousands of slaves were remitted into the 
Atlantic trade network. 
 
Within a context of economic growth the labor (im)migrant will probably be left to fend 
for himself within the state he has migrated to, as has been the tendency when it comes to 
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 Aftenposten 03.09.08:  An example of one of many articles from Norwegian newspapers about this 
reform:  http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/politikk/article2632992.ece  
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Spain.  But, when the tide turns and the state experiences an economic crisis the sudden 
formation of an excess workforce poses a problem on how to handle the competition 
between the native and the immigrant, both for the state and for the people in general (cf. 
Calavita 1998, 2006; Solé 2003).  The immigrant is in danger of being perceived as a 
threat, as an invader, an imposter and a thief, since he does not fit what is perceived as 
refugee characteristics; he is not in ‘need’ and is thus not ‘deserving’ (cf. Katz 1990). 
The Nomad as Criminal 
The controversy around nomadic and sedentary population is another vital dimension of 
the relation between the state and the poor which European states have struggled with for 
centuries (Katz 1990:12, Fuglerud 2001:59).  I extend this relation to include the state 
versus migrants.  Nomads are difficult to control and do not easily fit into the structure of 
the nation state.  Parallels can be drawn here to address the uneasiness immigrants meet 
from the state and its people when residing in a new country.  They do not hold an 
official nor and unofficial position in the social hierarchy of their new home and neither 
the immigrant nor the native (in this case) Basque or Spaniard might know exactly how 
to categorize and make sense of this new situation.  In this respect it is interesting to see 
how the Senegalese immigrant himself appears to adapt to the situation. He expresses 
himself as a legitimate resident of Spanish society through his discourse of ‘need’, even 
when he has already attained an official residence permit.  This constitutes an important 
aspect of the Senegalese migrants’ discourse on the migration experience, so as to 
construct a legitimate place for himself in Spanish/Basque society.  One example of this 
is the expression of “Barça o Barçakh” 31, “Barcelona or ‘death at sea’”32, a discourse 
promulgated by ‘pirogue’ migrants attempting to cross the Atlantic Ocean; an expression 
illustrating the desperation imbued in their actions. 
 
The problem of the nomad is not new within the Spanish state.  A prominent nomadic 
group that has been part of this society for centuries, and is very significant in the 
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 Patricia Ortega Dolz in El País 04/06/2006.  Viewed 07/06/2010 at: 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/portada/Destino/Barca/Barcakh/elpdompor/20060604elpdmgpor_1/Tes  
32
 The above article translates ‘Barçakh’ with ‘hell’, but I have chosen to use my informant’s translation of 
‘death at sea’. 
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consolidation of Spanish national identity through their folklore33, is the gypsies.  Despite 
this function within national symbology they appear to be people on the border of society; 
marginalized and stigmatized (cf. Cazorla 1976).  The portrayal of the immigrant as part 
of the categories of ‘criminals’ and ‘benefit scroungers’ is also increasingly frequent in 
Spanish media, although black Africans do not seem to be the most stigmatized group34. 
 
The discourses and practices construing, and perhaps constructing, the immigrant as 
‘criminal’ were exemplified through Masseck’s (27) accounts.  Of my informants he was 
the most ‘integrated’ one; married to a Basque woman and co-founder of an NGO 
promoting multi- and interculturalism.  After 8 years in Bilbao he had strong opinions on 
both Spanish, Basque and Senegalese politics, including migration issues.  Masseck told 
me that even if immigrants appreciate the help they get from the Basque government, 
there is still discrimination, and this discrimination engenders criminal actions:  
You see all the immigrants being sent, when they arrive, to San 
Fran[cisco]; to the worst part of town.  It is like this in all Western 
countries; the immigrants live in the worst part of town.  Do you think 
they come here and are criminals?  No, they are made criminals.  When 
you don’t have anything to eat you start stealing.  […]  They want us to 
integrate; but how can we with the message we get? 
   
He gave me another example of this implicit message of official and folk 
discourse (Ortner 2006:26) from recent news stories: 
About a year ago 4 or 5 pirogue boats in international waters were spotted.  
They were in the waters between Spain and Italy, but nobody wanted to 
help them.  They stayed days in the pirogue boats because no one wanted 
to take responsibility.  Not long after that a cow fell from a boat and a big 
rescue was set into action.  What kind of message is this?  If these people 
were Canadian the matter would be very different! […]  But we have to 
put up with it. 
 
The Global North’s discourses on migration that have developed throughout centuries 
with other hegemonic discourses such as those of the deserving versus the undeserving 
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 E.g. flamenco dance, cantautores, and colorful dresses. 
34
 When talking to autochthonous people in the Basque country the image of Africa south of Sahara is 
often that of poverty and despair, thus allowing for an understanding of  black Africans as more 
‘deserving’ of pity and assistance. 
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poor, and nomads versus the sedentary population, is arguably a part of Senegalese 
immigrants in Spain’s daily experiences.  The contemporary European perception of 
“migration as a threat” (Boswell 2003) is a constructed concept hailing from experiences 
around the encounter, and thus conceptualization of, ‘the other’. This conceptualization 
contributes to the displacement of immigrants within Spanish/Basque societal structures 
and to implicit and explicit practices of discrimination.  The Senegalese migrant’s 
trajectory for arrival to Spain is linked to the history of his country of origin, as this sets 
the stage for e.g. the international laws applying to Senegalese citizens’ right to travel. 
 
International Law and Organizations:  Laying the Ground for Spanish 
Immigration Law 
The UN, EU, and Schengen 
The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, the Schengen 
Agreement of 1985, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1997 have all contributed to the formation of policies regarding migration within and into 
what is now the European Union.  These international agreements have in turn 
contributed in shaping both the current Spanish discourses of immigration and the legal 
measures taken to cope with what is now considered “the migration problem” (Boswell 
2003:623-24, cf. Zimmerman 1995). 
 
New realities within Europe and Spain are certainly also an important factor in the 
formation of these discourses and legal measures.  Immigration to Spain has increased 
enormously in the last decade (see Chapter 1).  As the immigrant becomes more visible in 
Spanish society the need for policies addressing the issues regarding the new residents of 
the Spanish state become more pressing, so as to show the public “audience” that the 
“problem” is being dealt with (cf. Neal 2009).  Spain has been involved in one of the 
main current approaches to the “migration threat” (Boswell 2003) on EU level, the 
formation of Frontex, while also seeking to hinder immigration through direct interaction 
with the Senegalese state. 
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Prevention and Intervention:  Frontex and Bilateral Agreements between Spain 
and Senegal 
The Council of the European Union established its border protection agency Frontex on 
26 October 2004, as a response to the perceived connection “between terrorism, security, 
migration and borders” (Neal 2009:338).  It has been argued that this was done as a 
securitization measure in a post 9-11 world, and the Frontex Mission Statement also 
supports this argument:  To coordinate “intelligence driven operational co-operation at 
EU level to strengthen security at the external borders” (Neal 2009:333), i.e. to hinder 
illegal immigration. 
 
Frontex derived from the idea of a “European Border Police” discussed by Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain in October 2001 and “was created particularly to 
integrate national border security systems of Member States against all kind of threats 
that could happen at or through the external border of the Member States of the European 
Union”35, though Neal (2009) argues that EU cannot, despite its politics of European 
integration, be considered or treated as one polity.  The different nation states within the 
EU are likely to perceive ‘threat’ and ‘insecurity’ differently according to their historical 
and more recent experiences of e.g. immigration.  The ‘audience’ and policy makers 
within Mediterranean states are likely to feel more threatened by e.g. mass maritime 
migration than the Nordic countries and therefore see the need for different types of 
policies than their Nordic counterparts.  Although Frontex can be understood as part of 
EU’s project of European awareness and identity construction, following the nation state 
paradigm, in practice it will hold different meanings to different nation states, depending 
on their histories and socio-political experiences, even if immigration is construed as an 
external threat within most, if not all, member states. 
 
6. FRONTEX: Liberty, security, and justice.  But for whom?36 
 
                                                 
35
 FRONTEX home page, visited May 11, 2010: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/origin_and_tasks/origin/  
36
 Image from FRONTEX home page, visited May 19, 2010: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/  
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It has also been argued (Calavita 2003:122) that part of the reason for Spanish 
immigration policy is exactly the general European discourse of seeing the ‘other’ as a 
threat to national security, a discourse that has been present in Europe for centuries (cf. 
Katz 1990), and that has been part of the basis of the nation state as a structure.  This 
differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ is used as a justification of protectionist 
practices over domestic markets, with the idea of the autochthonous worker’s prevalent 
precedence over the guest worker in terms of legal rights and social security (Sole 2003, 
Calavita 1998, 2003).  As I show below the discriminatory legal practices of this 
discourse has been pointed out by several authors.  As Spain falls relentlessly deeper into 
economic decline, things are looking grim for its population of immigrant workers.    
 
The ‘Rapid Border Intervention Teams’ (RABIT) established by Frontex in 2007 have 
been of substantial significance for potential Senegalese migrants.  The stated purpose of 
these teams is to provide  
rapid operational assistance for a limited period to a requesting Member 
State facing a situation of urgent and exceptional pressure, especially the 
arrival at points of the external borders of large numbers of third-country 
nationals trying to enter the territory of the Member State illegally37 
 
Since Spain is on of the European countries most ‘threatened’ by non-EU migration due 
to its geographical location, such programs seem designed especially with Spanish (and 
Italian) challenges in mind38.  
 
The Spanish and Senegalese states have also signed bilateral agreements regarding legal 
immigration to Spain as a strategy towards stopping illegal migration.  The strategy 
involves 15 million of Spanish aid to Senegal annually over a five year period (started in 
2006) and the establishment of a Spanish worker recruitment office in Senegal.  In 
response the Senegalese state should assist Spain in repatriating illegal migrants that have 
                                                 
37
 Procedure file from the European Parliament’s Legislative Observatory, emphasis in original.  Viewed 
May 20, 2010:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5373052  
38
“RABIT to run EU border patrols”, published April 27, 2007.  Viewed May 20, 2010: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/rabit-run-eu-border-patrols/article-163429  
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reached Spanish territory.  The collaboration aims to “discourage illegal immigration”39, 
a goal that has not been properly reached.  If old routes are intercepted, new routes are 
found (cf. Hernández 2008); the need and desire for movement among potential migrants 
do not seem to have been extinguished by these inter-government policies. 
 
Prevention and intervention strategies, products of international collaborations, do not 
seem to have the desired effect.  Migrants, both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ still seem to find their 
way to Spanish shores.  In the next section I will address the ways in which the Spanish 
state have dealt with the “migration problem” within the legal dimension on a national 
level, before looking into the current global recession’s effect on Spanish immigration 
policies. 
 
(Il)legality and Spanish Immigration Law 
Spain got its first immigration law in 1985 after the turnover from a country of 
emigration to a country of immigration (Calavita 2006, Solé 2003).  Once Northern 
European countries closed their borders to labor migration after the 1973 oil crisis, Spain 
not only became a country of return migration, but also, among its Southern European 
counterparts, a gateway to Fortress Europe.  Northern European countries’ decision to 
limit legal immigration to that based on rights to asylum (according to the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951) and family reunion, made the 
Mediterranean countries attractive destinations for both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ work 
migrants (Boswell 2003, Zimmerman 1995).   
 
The tendency towards a gradual closure of borders also in Southern Europe is becoming 
apparent as the Mediterranean countries follow in the footsteps of Northern Europe.  This 
tendency shows both a protectionist maneuver in terms of the domestic (labor) market as 
national economies reaches new stages of ‘development’, and intents to adapt to EU’s 
intention of European integration.  As the presence of ‘the Great Recession’ is felt 
                                                 
39
“Spain in Senegal migration deal” in BBC News online October 11, 2006.  Viewed May 18, 2010: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6039624.stm  
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throughout the Spanish state, the pitfalls of Spanish immigration law become 
continuously clearer.  Calavita (1998, 2006), Solé (2003), and De Genova (2002) show 
how immigrants in Spain simply ‘cannot win’.  I argue that la crisis makes their plight 
even more difficult. 
 
Calavita (2006:198) compares Spanish and Italian immigration policies and practices and 
shows how they place the transnational migrant from the Global South within the global 
economy, arguing that not only is this placement a result of a global historical inequality 
but it also regenerates the same inequalities in the continuous reproduction of the 
(im)migrant as the ‘other’.  Although both Italy and Spain are new countries of 
immigration, Italy has a slightly longer history than Spain as a gateway for non-EU 
citizens to the European labor market. It has been argued that Spain’s practical and legal 
approach has been shaped with Italy as an example.  States that the 1990s was a decade 
of stabilization for immigrants in Italy who have continuously become more important 
for the Italian economy, and more are being employed in ‘normal’ jobs.  It is thus 
probable to see the same tendency in Spain, although the economic crisis seems to be 
slowing down this process to a great extent (Calavita 2006:196-197).  An important 
example of this is the 2009 reform of Spanish Immigration Law which I will look into 
below. 
The ‘Initiality’ of Spanish Immigration Law 
The immigration law, Ley de extranjeria, has been revised and reformed several times, in 
light of the Spanish labor market’s needs.  Calavita (1998, 2006) and Solé (2003) argue 
that the intention of Spanish immigration law is first and foremost to control illegal 
immigration.  The law itself claims to pursue the integration of the immigrant into 
Spanish society and ensure his/her rights.  The result of the law, however, is neither.  It 
does not control how many immigrants enter the Spanish state, but instead determines 
how those who do enter should be socioeconomically included or excluded.  Calavita 
(1998:531) argues that Spanish policies of immigration are designed in a manner so “that 
the predictable consequence is to marginalize Third World immigrants and consign them 
to the extensive underground economy”.  For this  
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[it] makes little sense to draw distinctions between legal and illegal 
immigrants, as if they were different populations, because the law ensures 
that legal status is temporary and subject to continuous disruptions. 
(Calavita 1998:531) 
 
Following Calavita’s argument Spanish immigration law is, then, focused on the initial 
stages of the immigration experience (Solé 2003:127), despite of several and recent 
reforms.  Thorough consideration is not given to how new residents of Spanish territory 
best should be integrated into society.  The characteristics of initiality of the policies in 
questions are similar to those of the post World War II German Gastarbeiterprogramm 
(Fuglerud 2001); the name of the scheme itself implying a clear supposition of the 
temporality of the immigrant’s residence; that he/she would leave once his/her job was 
done.  The same attitude is visible in Spanish policies: 
Immigrants in […] Spain are first and foremost workers, and they are 
reluctantly tolerated because there is work to be done.  As if they were 
unexpected (and unpopular) guests at a dinner where they were the only 
ones willing to do the dishes, they are allowed to stay, but only on certain 
conditions and only until the dishes are done. (Calavita 2006:19140) 
 
The Spanish immigration law and programs of legalization that have been done every 
few years are thus specifically designed for the working immigrant.  This means that the 
immigrant depends on having a work contract or recently having had one in order to 
acquire a resident permit.  When the recession hit Spain, and especially sectors where 
many immigrants worked, the attainment of legal residency has become as good as 
impossible for those who were not already ‘in the system’.  For those who have had legal 
residency, but lost their job on account of the recession, the maintenance of their legality 
depends on whether or not they succeed in finding new employment.  Calavita (2006:193) 
argues that Spanish immigration law is actually based on illegality, through haphazard 
and temporary residence permits.  She employs Santos’ (1993:111) concept of 
“institutionalized irregularity” to describe the situation.  This irregularity is supported by 
a both symbiotic and competing relationship between immigrant and autochthonous 
workers (Solé 2003). 
                                                 
40
 My translation from Spanish. 
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Senegalese Immigrants and Labor Unions 
The Spanish labor unions have fought long and hard for their rights after the fall of 
Franco’s regime in 1975, but the immigrant worker, more often than not unorganized, is 
not accounted for in these agreements, and has for this reason been recruited by 
employers.  Thus, the local worker is protected through the law and “networks of social 
protection” (Solé 2003:124), while the immigrant worker has little “bargaining capacity” 
(ibid.) since his network stands without a legal framework.  He is therefore easily 
exploited in the Spanish labor market since he is dependant on his employer for his legal 
status (cf. Solé 2003). 
 
The relationship between immigrant and local workers is severed by these legal practices.  
Instead of standing together they compete (cf. Solé 2003).  Although the relationship 
between these two groups can be seen as symbiotic to a certain extent, considering the 
different niches they fill, it is actually a relation of competition steered by employers and 
an, once scrutinized, overall ethnified discourse.  Labor unions side with employers to 
avoid what is perceived as immigrants’ “downward pressure on wages [that undermines] 
the social protection that labour has historically managed to win from capital” (Solé 
2003:132). 
 
The juridical discrimination of immigrants, especially those ‘illegal’, can threaten the 
migration project, but the Senegalese’s perception of his own position within Spanish 
society is of substantial significance in order to understand why he maintains his 
ambitions.  As argued in Chapter 2, the ambitions for the migration project lay in an 
eventual return to Senegal; it is the socioeconomic advancement within the migrant’s 
own society that is imperative.  This same perception can also partly explain the low level 
of immigrant membership in labor unions, since this  
is not necessarily synonymous with a lack of organisation or involvement in 
collective initiatives by immigrant workers, since on occasions, such participation 
is channeled through organisations belonging to the respective ethnic 
communities (Colectivo IOÉ 1999b). (Solé 2003:134) 
 
Again the membership in the migrant’s social network from home is crucial.  It is usually 
through this that he accesses the migration project, finds employment and housing, and 
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builds social capital through having the possibility to give others access to the same 
resources.  When I asked my informants about labor union membership most seemed to 
lack knowledge of this sort of organization, or they deemed it too costly.  In the Basque 
Country, including Herrixka, there are several examples of formal Senegalese 
organizations that are based on an already existing (informal) social network, and thus 
often reflect e.g. ethnic belonging.  These organizations are particularly directed towards 
the cultural and socioeconomic aspects of the Senegalese migrant’s predicament.  The 
reliance on these (in-)formal organizations has had great significance for the viability of 
the migration project once the Spanish labor market was hit by la crisis (see next 
subsection and Chapter 5). 
‘Immigrant Niches’ in the Spanish Labor Market 
Calavita (2006:193) draws on Meillassoux (1981) when comparing Spanish policies of 
immigration to that of South Africa’s system of ‘passes’.  Under apartheid black people 
could only work in white areas if they bore the required pass, and these passes were 
issued according to the needs of white employers.  She argues that Spanish immigration 
law works in the same way in that it renders possible “the length of [the immigrant’s] 
stay according to the necessity of the [Spanish] economy” (2006:193).  Another 
interesting comparison mentioned, with reference to Harris (1995), is of immigrants as 
the “new untouchables”, considering their vulnerability as a result of their dependence on 
a work contract for their legal residency (2006:197).  One can draw these analogies 
further if one considers the system of quotas established by Spanish law in 1993, where a 
certain number of immigrants are allowed to (legally) enter Spanish territory each year.  
This number is decided upon based on the needs of certain sectors within the Spanish 
economy, such as those of agriculture, construction, domestic work, and catering.  This 
practice contributes to the creation of ‘immigrant niches’ in the Spanish labor market 
(Calavita 2006:197) and thus opens for discrimination and racism both on the job and in 
society in general (Solé 2003), while maintaining the immigrant’s “dishwasher” role, 
often, but not exclusively, within the secondary economy. 
 
The majority of the women I met in Herrixka worked in a local shop they called la goma; 
‘the rubber’.  Here they sit for hours on end cutting off excess rubber from molded pieces 
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that are to be sent and used within local factories of car parts.  The workers are paid per 
piece cut and thus depend on working as fast as possible (I was told a day’s pay usually 
amounts to between 6 and 11 Euros).  The owner of the shop is an Armenian man who 
apparently has found his own niche within the Basque market.  He has employed a 
Senegalese ‘recruiter’ who is responsible for hiring workers for the shop.  The employees 
are thus mostly Senegalese and ‘illegal’, making for inexpensive employees as they 
cannot access the formal labor market, especially not now during la crisis. 
 
‘La goma’ exemplifies the duality of Spain’s immigration policies, allowing for the 
residence of “illegal” workers who do jobs that autochthonous workers would not accept.  
The same law allows for irregular immigrants to be empadronados, enrolled in the public 
census of one’s municipality of residence, giving them access to public goods such as 
education and health care.  But when times are difficult, as they currently are, they still 
risk expulsion from the Spanish state.  I will elaborate more on this paradox below. 
The Paradox of Juridical Policies and Practices Affect Migrant Lives 
The Spanish state has been in dire need of immigration in order to supply labor for 
certain sectors of its economy, but Spanish immigration law has concurrently opened for 
discriminative practices that can harm society over time, possibly creating racism, unrest 
and the type of revolts we have seen in France, Britain, and Italy in the last few years.  
The paradox of Spanish immigration law also severely impacts the lives of my 
informants.  It sets the framework for how they shape their strategy for social mobility 
once they have entered the Spanish state, relying on the work opportunities available 
according to their legal status.  Now that the Spanish state, economy, and labor market 
are trembling with fear for the future, the discourse of immigrants’ disposability of the 
law (and its recent reforms) exposes the immigrant as one of the most vulnerable of 
Spain’s residents, since his/her status as a “guest willing to do the dishes at the party” 
(Calavita 2006) now seems to have expired.  So even if Spain has been very dependent 
on immigrant labor to develop its national economy, the applicable laws are formed 
through a discourse of the immigrant as a national threat and problem. 
 
 65 
An indirect result of these discourses is then that “immigrants are made to depend on the 
renewal of their work contract in order to be able to continue to reside legally in the 
country, which consequently reduces their ‘negotiation power’” (Solé 2003:128).  This is 
an important point in terms of my informants in the Basque Country.  Because of their 
dependence on a work contract for becoming, or staying, ‘legal’, most do not risk leaving 
Spanish territory for fear that they never will be able to come back. 
 
Had the immigrant held a more withstanding ‘negotiation power’, through e.g. trade 
unions, before la crisis, then he/she might have had a more stable residence status in the 
current recession ridden Spanish society.  Spanish trade unions have few immigrant 
members and Solé (2003) argues that fear of losing one’s employment, together with the 
lack of knowledge of what a trade union is, are the main reasons for this.  She points to 
the fact that most immigrant trade unionists are from Latin America, where this type of 
organization is quite common, while immigrants from Africa usually have little 
acquaintance with these formal social interest groups.  This might result in a preference 
for a focus on their own social networks; networks that they see as more capable of 
promoting their interests. 
 
In pre-recession Spain this way of thinking might very well have been the most adequate 
for the Senegalese immigrant’s interest.  Seeing as the Spanish trade unions have not 
been able to adapt properly to the existence of a distinct workforce within their territory 
(cf. Solé 2003), perhaps with different interests than the autochthonous worker, “sticking 
to one’s own” might have been the best decision.  It is through friendship and kinship 
contacts that most Senegalese immigrant workers attain work permits, employment, and a 
place to live: 
Mouhamed arrived in Spain through his uncle who had lived many years 
in Herrixka, but with his two wives in Dakar.  Mouhamed was first asked 
to go to Dakar and live in his uncle’s house to watch over his wives.  After 
a couple of years in Dakar his uncle told him that he now ‘deserved’ to 
come to Spain.  He arranged a work permit for his nephew, but 
Mouhamed himself had to organize the Senegalese paperwork.  He needed 
to get a passport, and this can be an arduous process in Senegal; 
sometimes you will have to wait for two years!  When he arrived at the 
passport issuing clerk’s desk the man behind it looked at his papers, at his 
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name.  He asked Mouhamed “who is your father?” Mouhamed answered 
him whereas the clerk told him that he had lived in his father’s house 
before Mouhamed was born.  The village where the clerk was from did not 
have a school and Mouhamed’s father had allowed him to stay with him to 
get an education.  The clerk was very grateful.  And Mouhamed got his 
passport within a week and could thus leave for Spain. 
 
But relying on one’s social network has had repercussions once the recession set in in the 
Spanish market.  Depending on an informal network with few strong ties to the power 
structures of law and economy in Spain, la crisis has left the Senegalese immigrant with 
few choices but to ‘wait it out’ if he is to keep following his strategy for social mobility.  
 
 La crisis in Spain 
The Causes 
The causes of the Spanish crisis are widely discussed, both academically and politically, 
and not entirely agreed upon.  The interlinkages with the global financial crisis are 
apparent, but the degree to which these have mattered and made the crisis as severe as it 
has become, is not agreed upon.  PSOE41 was in government for a second consecutive 
period42 when the crisis made its entrance, a fact that the Partido Popular (PP) has not let 
slide, blaming much of the crisis and what they deem a poor way of handling it, on PSOE.  
One example is Fernández’43 (2008) article on the “foreboded crisis”.  The “crisis of 
competitiveness” (ibid.) surges from the deficit and following bankruptcies of families 
and businesses, the latter leading to an enormous increase in unemployment, and thus an 
aggravation in the former’s situation.  The reason for this situation, says Fernandez, 
cannot be blamed so much on the world financial crisis, although this may have 
accelerated the process, as on the poor politics of the Spanish government, meaning the 
PSOE:  The ‘real’ reason for la crisis is the irresponsibility and short-sightedness of the 
PSOE government.  The question then remains whether this short-sightedness has been 
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 PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español (The Spanish Socialist Party) 
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 PSOE were in government from the elections of 1982 to 1996, when they were replaced by PP (Partido 
Popular – The People’s Party).  PP governed Spain until 2004 when they again were replaced by PSOE. 
43
 A liberal economist publishing through FAES, a private research institution headed by José María Aznar, 
former head of PP 
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part of PSOE’s plan (or lack thereof) for Spain, or whether what he calls the 
“construction monoculture” of the Spanish economy has not been a (not well thought 
through) strategy of the Spanish state in general.  In their race to achieve economic 
growth and a ‘European’ standard of living, no one spoke of the monocultivated Spanish 
(labor) market (‘why fix it if it ain’t broke?’) until the bubble was about to burst.  This 
tendency was present under both under PSOE’s and PP’s previous periods in government.   
 
The Basque (labor) market is more diverse and not as dominated by one or a few 
important sectors, such as the case is in other regions of Spain.  The sectors with strong 
ties to the secondary economy (and therefore employing ‘black’ workers), such as 
construction, agriculture, and the tourist industry, do not stand as strong in the Basque 
Country.  This results in fewer immigrants in this region, but also greater chances of 
becoming ‘legal’, judging by my informants’ accounts.  The greater variety in the Basque 
economy has been favorable when the recession hit, but has still lead to a severe increase 
in unemployment and a general downturn for many enterprises.  Although la crisis, then, 
has not been as acute here as in other regions, the daily life of my informants in the 
Basque Country is still marked by a feeling of insecurity and doubts about one’s future 
within the Spanish state. 
Senegalese Resist Abandonment of Migration Project 
Most of my informants who had been employed formally in the Basque Country had only 
been so through temporary contracts, normally through an ‘ETT’44.  This is a common 
way of hiring workers in Spain and allows employers the liberty to hire people for shorter 
periods of time and thus avoid extra expenses when business is slow.  My informants told 
me that before the crisis this had been a good arrangement also for them, since it gave 
them the opportunity to spend long vacations in Senegal in between their contracts, a 
luxury a permanent contract would not allow.  Seydhi (32) in Herrixka even told me he 
had declined an offer of a permanent contract from his employer not long before the 
crisis. This practice of temporary employment has thus, retrospectively, backfired for the 
Senegalese worker in general, but perhaps given some companies in the Basque Country 
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 ETT – Empresa de trabajo temporal:  Temporary staff recruitment agency 
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the ability to survive the crisis, hopefully giving workers employment possibilities in the 
future. 
 
Solé (2003) argues from a Marxist point of view, that the discourse of the Spanish system 
of production and distribution presumes that immigrants will yield from the Spanish labor 
market in times of economic crisis, since it is then that “the role of reserve army that 
immigrant workers play is remembered, and it is assumed that they will not resist their 
potential exclusion or marginalisation [sic] in the economic sphere” (Solé 2003:123).  In 
the case of my informants quite the opposite seems to be happening.  The Senegalese in 
the Basque Country are not about to abandon the migration project just yet, even if they 
are aware of the rise in antagonism against them.  Many stay on and wait it out, while 
others alter their strategies somewhat. 
  
Yakhoub (53) left for the Basque Country in 2002; older than most migrants.  He 
obtained a contract through Adecco, a well-known ‘ETT’, before leaving, and has been 
able to maintain his ‘legality’.  I met him in Senegal, in a neighboring village of Dekka, 
through one of my informants there, and it soon turned out we knew some of the same 
people back in the Basque Country.  He used to live in Herrixka, but now lives in a 
slightly larger village nearby.  He says that before the crisis everything was fine.  He has 
‘always’ lived in the Basque Country, and the wage level and social benefits there are 
generally good, although life is more expensive than in other parts of Spain.  But the 
crisis has brought a new reality.  His last contract expired in September 2008, and after he 
finished his unemployment benefit in December 2008 he decided to go to Senegal to wait 
out the crisis there.  This is a luxury available to those fortunate enough to have a long-
term residence permit, allowing them to re-enter Spain once leaving.  I asked him why he 
thought so many stayed in Spain even if they would be able to go to Senegal temporarily; 
“They think it will change.  But living abroad is dangerous.  The racism that it can 
produce.  Many consequences.”  He says that he only knows of one other person who has 
decided to go to Senegal like him; most people stay in Spain to wait (even if I did meet 
several people in Dakar who had done what he did, although they resided in the Southern 
Spain). 
 69 
Yakhoub tries to do some small business while he is in Senegal.  He has cultivated onions 
whenever he went home to visit while living in Spain.  He is still trying that out, and he 
has also brought with him carpentry machines from Spain.  He tells me that it is working 
out quite well:   
I am trying out that business.  If everything goes well I will bring more.  If 
I cannot find a job [in Spain] I will continue with that.  If you have 
customers and you have the opportunity to make a workshop here it will 
go well.  […]  I should not have sold them [(the machines)], but with the 
crisis you need to sell and make some money.  But […] I will make a 
workshop.  It goes well because the construction [sector] here is doing 
well.  And agriculture too. 
 
Yakhoub’s business schemes seem quite typical for many migrants.  When I asked my 
informants in the Basque Country what they wanted for their future, most seemed 
reluctant to answer since the future of the present seems so insecure.  But then many told 
me about this sort of schemes; making small businesses where their friends and family 
could work, finding ways of making money while keeping one foot in Spain and one in 
Senegal.  But most are still waiting; to be able to put such a scheme into life you need 
certain resources like a residency permit, financial reserve, and a broad social network.  
Apparently Yakhoub has been fortunate in this sense. It is of course also a question of 
taking a leap of faith.  When I asked him about what sort of effects he considered the 
crisis has had on people’s lives, he answered: “[Now] you have to work with your head.  
You cannot always work with [physical] strength.  [But] some do it and some do not.  It 
depends on the person’s spirit.” 
Changes in Spanish Immigration Legislation and Practices as a Response to ‘La 
crisis’ 
The economic recession has lead to reconsiderations of state policies within several 
sectors.  The policies regarding migration were questioned early on, while other reforms 
aiming to get the Spanish economy back on its feet has only recently been taking shape.  I 
illustrate Spanish authorities’ ‘spectacle’ (cf. Neal 2009) of crisis governance through the 
following three cases:  The reform of the Ley de extranjería, the municipal council of 
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Vic’s restrictions in terms of the above mentioned empadronamiento45 practices, and the 
Plan de Retorno Voluntario. 
 
The main focus of the 2009 reform of Spanish immigration law has been to “obstruct the 
arrival of new immigrants given the economic crisis and the continuous increase of 
unemployment”46.  It also aims to make the expulsion of immigrants already residing in 
Spain easier.  The reform has been criticized47 for several reasons.  It continues the 
favoring of EU citizens and it reinforces the criminalization of the non-EU immigrant.  It 
also makes family reunification more difficult, and makes the legislation relevant to 
attain this vague so as to open for haphazard practices that can be manipulated to benefit 
the Spanish state in any given moment.  The reform also makes the economical assistance 
of irregular migrants illegal, and criminalizes the empadronamiento of immigrants in a 
place of residence where he/she does not actually live, although NGOs dedicated to the 
assistance of ‘illegal’ immigrants are permitted to continue their work.  This particular 
legislation can of course have severe impacts on the ways in which Senegalese 
immigrants in Spain assist each other in difficult times. 
 
The recent case of the municipal council of Vic has been extensively covered by Spanish 
media48.  Even if it is temporally situated mainly outside of my fieldwork period I have 
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the right to basic social goods, such as education and health services and is also employed by the 
immigrant to prove the duration of his stay (the requirement being 3 years in combination with an 
employment contract for at least one year) in Spain in order to apply for a residence permit. 
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 “El gobierno endurece la ley de extranjería para frenar la llegada de inmigrantes” by Melchor Sáiz-Pardo 
October 5, 2008 in ideal.es.  Viewed April 30, 2010 (quote translated from Spanish by me): 
http://www.ideal.es/granada/20081005/espana/gobierno-endurece-extranjeria-para-20081005.html  
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“IU afirma que la reforma de la Ley de Extranjería muestra la ‘cara represiva’ de la política de 
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2010.  Viewed May 20,2010: http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20100506/ayuntamiento-vic-informa-los-casos-
inmigrantes-situacion-irregular/330301.shtml 
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decided to include it here as an illustration of the conflictive processes at large in the 
Spanish state.   
 
The general story of this case starts in January of 2010 when the municipal council of Vic 
in the Autonomous Community of Cataluña decides it will no longer accept the 
empadronamiento of “illegal” immigrants residing in the municipality.  This decision 
goes against Spanish federal law, as stated in the Ley de extranjería even after the reform 
of 2009.  The empadronamiento is done through the registration of oneself as a resident 
of a certain municipality.  In order to be able to register you need to prove that you live at 
a given address, through e.g. presenting a lease.  The empadronamiento then gives you 
rights to basic public services such as health care and education, basically ensuring your 
human rights even if you are an “illegal” resident of the Spanish state.  The 
empadronamiento is also the easiest and most common way of proving the time of 
residency completed, so as to access legal residency more easily49. 
 
To ensure these basic human rights take resources, and in a country undergoing critical 
economic difficulties costs have to be cut.  The municipality of Vic decided to cut in the 
services offered to ‘illegals’ by denying them the right to empadronamiento.  The 
Spanish state reacted with stating that this was against federal law.  Vic complied 
temporarily before reporting the case to the EU Commission for Home Affairs, headed by 
Cecilia Malmström.  It was there decided that “‘Spanish authorities are not free to 
                                                                                                                                                 
“El Gobierno de Aguirre apoya las limitaciones en los padrones” by Pablo de Llano in El País Jan. 20, 2010.  
Accessed May 20, 2010: 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Gobierno/Aguirre/apoya/limitaciones/padrones/elpepiesp/2010
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”Vic empadronará inmigrantes tras la intervención de Madrid” in Gara.net Jan. 22, 2010.  Viewed May 20, 
2010: 
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”Rajoy exige al Gobierno que modifique la Ley de Extranjería tras los ‘efectos de demagogia’ en Vic” in El 
Correo, Jan. 16, 2010.  Viewed May 20, 2010: 
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tolerate the irregular situation of immigrants once they are aware of it”50.  Spanish federal 
law is thus deemed as going against EU regulations of immigration, although this part of 
the legislation was shaped to ensure ‘illegal’ immigrants basic rights as stated in 
international legislation of human rights.  The outcome of this conflict is yet to be seen, 
but it thoroughly exemplifies pitfalls in both Spanish federal law, international law, and 
the intersections between these. 
 
Another juridical result of the economic crisis in Spain is the elaboration of the Plan de 
Retorno Voluntario, or Voluntary Repatriation Plan.  This was a program established to 
promote the voluntary return migration of already ‘legal’ migrants through the 
‘capitalization’ of unemployment benefits.  During my fieldwork in Bilbao I met with 
Elmami Brahim, a Southern Saharan lawyer specialized in Spanish immigration 
legislation.  He explained the concept of this program to me and others, through his 
appearances on a show on Radio Tropical in Bilbao, directed at (primarily Latin-
American) immigrants.  Here he answered the legal questions of anonymous callers 
concerned about their situations.  Many worried about family reunions and work 
contracts, but there were also several questions about the new repatriation plan.  The 
immigrant is offered the disbursement of the unemployment benefits they are entitled to 
in two equal portions, instead of smaller, monthly shares.  The first portion is to be paid 
while the immigrant is still in Spain, while the second is to be paid through 
representatives of Spanish authorities in the country of origin once the immigrant has 
returned home.  The concerns of the callers to Radio Tropical were about the guarantees 
for the second payment; what were they to do if they upon their return did not receive the 
promised amount? 
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 My translation from Spanish of quotation from "Vic informará al Gobierno de los ‘sin papeles’ que 
empadrone” by EFE Barcelona April 9, 2010 in El Correo online.  Viewed May 20, 2010:  
http://www.elcorreo.com/vizcaya/20100409/mas-actualidad/sociedad/informara-gobierno-papeles-
empadrone-201004091908.html  
 73 
These types of concerns seem to have made most immigrants decide against this 
arrangement51.  Most of those who have chosen to use this program have been from 
Colombia or Ecuador.  My Senegalese informants were generally not considering return 
as an option, even if they did have the right to unemployment benefits.  Migration for my 
informants is about more than economic gain (cf. Lambert 2002, Fagertun 2009); even if 
this stagnates temporarily one cannot take the easy way out and go home.  Ousmane (28) 
told me that a Senegalese “always returns”; it is not an option for most to be buried 
outside of Senegal, nor to marry a non-Senegalese.  People want to maintain their 
relationship with their country.  Still, you cannot return home with “empty hands”.  To 
‘fill your hands’ is why you emigrate in the first place:  to earn money, to help out, to take 
care of the family.   
If you go back without anything people will talk.  They will think you 
have not been working, that you are lazy.  People will point to you in the 
street and say “the son of such-and-such has gone to Europe and done 
nothing, just ‘lived life’”.  This is shameful for the family.   
 
So even if the crisis has made filling one’s hands more difficult, going home would be 
the last resort.  And staying holds a value in itself (cf. Bourdieu 1977). 
 
Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the viability of the Senegalese migration project depends on 
power relations inherent in macro structures and processes (cf. Tsing 2005).  The 
discussions of my informants’ narrations vis-à-vis structural factors like the Western 
discourse on nomads and migrants, Spanish immigration legislation, and the processes 
taking place in Spain due to the current economic crisis have sought to substantiate this 
argument.  The migrant as an agent within his own life story must be understood in terms 
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him acting upon these (and other) structures.  His ‘agency’ is an individual strategy to 
generate friction to create change, through the accumulation of economical, cultural, 
social, and symbolical capital (cf. Tsing 2005, Bourdieu 1977).  But the “effects of 
encounters across difference can be compromising or empowering.  Friction is not a 
synonym for resistance.  Hegemony is made as well as unmade with friction” (Tsing 
2005:6).  Discourses define difference, and this definition excludes some groups from the 
possibility to access desirable subject positions such as those fronted by the discourse of 
‘modernity’ (cf. Moore 1994).  The migration project does therefore not necessarily 
challenge the mentioned power relations; it does not rebel against them.  This chapter has 
sought to show how migration is movement through structures, but also how this 
movement is restricted.   
 
In the following chapter I shall discuss the ways in which gender and identity 
construction is tied to the agent’s desire to migrate through the doxic and hegemonic 
discourses of man as providers and woman as nurturer (cf. Moore 1994, Bourdieu 1977).  
I thus discuss locally embedded power structures and I argue that migration is an 
outcome of Senegalese discourses on and practices of gender, but also a factor 
influencing the (re-)construction of these. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
Chapter 4 
Senegalese Gender Identity:  Negotiation and 
Reproduction of the Provider and Nurturer 
through ‘Modernity and Change 
 
 
We Serers say that the hand represents the different types of women.  The 
thumb is what impedes the other hand from slipping when you shake the 
hand of another.  The thumb grips.  A good woman grips when she is told 
and lets go when she is told.  She respects her husband.  The index finger 
gives orders.  A bad woman is like the index finger.  The middle finger is 
situated above the other fingers.  A bad woman thinks she is superior of 
others.  The ring finger is noble; a good woman.  And the little finger is 
the smallest, but the best one.  She respects her husband.  Even if she is 
small she is a good woman.   
Hassane (26) 
 
 
 
It is the right of a woman to have a rich man.  If I want a rich man then I 
marry a rich man.   
A fellow young 
female 
passenger on a 
pirogue boat on 
the Sine Saloum 
River 
 
 
Introduction 
So far I have shown how migration has been a part of Senegalese society for centuries, 
but that there are certain particularities to contemporary migration.  In Chapter 2 I argued 
that the migration project is a strategy for socioeconomic advancement and the (re-) 
production of the Senegalese household.  Chapter 3 showed how the migration project 
encounters macro structures of global processes and the Spanish state, generating friction.  
This friction can lead to change, but the sort of change created depends on the power 
relations present in the encounter between structures and agent (cf. Tsing 2005).  The 
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migration project as one such encounter thus enables movement towards the ‘good life’, 
but does not necessarily challenge the ‘structuring structures’ the migrant moves within 
(cf. Bourdieu 1977, Swartz 2002).  Global events, e.g. the current economic recession, 
can also create unforeseen hinders for the continuation such movement, and thus has 
severe implications for the individuals involved in the migration project. 
  
The reciprocal relationships (re-)produced within the Senegalese transcontinental 
household arguably involve gendered discourses on subject positions (cf. Moore 1994).  I 
argue that the migration project as a strategy for socioeconomic advancement is in itself 
gendered, and is more likely to be pursued by men than women due to the Senegalese 
discourse of man as provider and woman as nurturer, and discuss marriage as a possible 
correlating strategy for women.  Through my informants’ account I show how Senegalese 
gender identity is constructed and construed and how household and material production 
is organized through kinship and generation in (rural) Senegal.  Furthermore I will shed 
light on the continuous processes of change at hand when it comes to the construction of 
(gender) identity, by showing the ambiguity by which Senegalese feminine identity is 
represented by her male counterparts; to the Senegalese man women seem to be both the 
continuation of and a danger to ‘tradition’. 
 
As Senegalese society is continuously being reshaped, its cultural discourses are being 
renegotiated.  This renegotiation seems to both challenge and preserve hegemonic gender 
discourses as they are shaped by both local and global socio-cultural processes (cf. 
Lambert 2002).  Mass media and migration are two such processes (cf. Appadurai 1998).  
There is not always consensus as to what is the dominant gender discourse, as “the 
experience of race, sexuality and class, as well as other forms of salient difference, 
transform the experience of gender” (Moore 1994:15).  Looking at the representations of 
woman- and manhood through hegemonic gendered subject positions, and how these are 
challenged through differing practices, is thus essential to understand which discourses 
are flowing beneath the surface of Senegalese ‘tradition’ (cf. Moore 1994). 
 
 
 77 
Movement without Revolt: Ascending within Senegalese Society 
Although Senegal is considered to be one of few countries in Africa where democracy 
has had relative success, Senegalese women and men seem to be relatively discontent 
with the condition of their state.  Masseck’s (27) examples of firefighters and ambulances 
in Chapter 1 reflect a seemingly general experience of the state; that its supposed function 
of (re-)distributor of resources and enabler of socioeconomic stability and advancement is 
not fulfilled.  To excel and prosper the agent needs to rely on himself and his contiguous 
social network (Lambert 2002:168-169). 
 
Throughout a lifetime different opportunities for (arduously) climbing society’s 
socioeconomic hierarchy might present themselves to the agent.  In Senegal there are 
there are certainly other such opportunities than those in focus here, migration and 
marriage, depending on factors such as age, generation, positions of power and prestige, 
ethnicity and economical affluence.  Relative to the agent’s position in society he/she will 
make different choices regarding strategies for advancing socioeconomically, since one’s 
place within the societal structures to a large degree determines the access to the 
economic and social resources that lay the basis for maneuvering within and beyond 
these structures.  One example in terms of gender and generation is the way many 
mothers in Senegal seem to wish for their sons to emigrate, so that they and their family 
will be secured economically in their old age.  A strategy of social mobility for a middle 
aged or aging woman from rural Senegal thus might be to encourage her son, both 
morally and perhaps economically, to go abroad, or at least to a larger city, so that he will 
have the chance to make a better income than in the village.  The reason for why it is 
specifically sons who are encouraged to migrate is tied to a man’s role as provider for the 
household, specifically if he is the eldest.  I will elaborate on this later in this chapter. 
 
The concept of strategy refers to choices made by individuals to achieve a goal, in this 
case the accumulation of economical, social, cultural, and symbolic capital in order to 
sustain and advance as an agent within one’s social networks (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  My 
understanding of the migration project as a strategy for movement does not reflect a view 
of the world as free of socio-economic structures that can inhibit, enable, or even prevent 
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such strategies.  The Comaroffs (cf. 2004a&b) discuss the post-apartheid rise in a South 
African “obsession” with crime in media, entertainment and folk discourse as a symptom 
of a governmentality process aimed at embedding and justifying power relations now 
taking shape in South Africa.  As part of the discussion lays the argument that crime in 
South Africa can be viewed as a way for agents to attempt a redistribution of resources 
within a system that allows for and even promotes economical inequality, namely the 
capitalist state.  Like crime, migration is a manner of operating outside established 
societal structures, although the moral implications of these schemes might be on the 
opposite side of the ‘right-wrong’ scale, depending on the cases in question.  
Transcontinental migration from Senegal often involves breaking national and 
international law (see Chapter 3), but socially it is not categorized with other sorts of 
‘criminal’ activities such as theft or violence; it is not deemed immoral.   In terms of the 
global economy migration is thus comparable to the Comaroffs’ (ibid.) view of 
criminality, although there are important differences when it comes to what these two 
strategies for economic gain might imply socially for the agents involved.  I also wish to 
underline that I do not perceive Senegalese transcontinental migration as an indication of 
a consolidated rupture of, revolt against, or resistance towards these global structures, as 
the Comaroffs (ibid.) imply.   
 
I do not find migration to be an organized attempt to fight a collective battle of and for 
the poor, but rather numerous individuals’ attempts to attain a better life for themselves 
and their families, through collaboration and dependency on each other.  My informants 
have made what they believed to be educated choices based on certain factors; the 
opportunities, information and knowledge available to them.  These factors are shaped by 
both ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, as they are part of the culture and society that fostered 
these individuals; a culture and society that are connected with the global market and 
media (cf. Appadurai 1996).  Their “capacity to aspire” (cf. Appadurai 2004) is neither 
grounded in ‘tradition’ nor ‘modern’ market economics, but global structural realities that 
can hold people back, while allowing for, and even implicitly promoting, certain types of 
solutions to problems partially caused by the same structures.  The strategies pursued by 
my informants have hence been shaped on the individual, social and global level. 
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Marriage and Migration 
When looking at national surveys of immigration to Spain, the immense discrepancy 
between the number of Senegalese male and female immigrants within the Spanish state, 
and the Basque Country, is striking.  Although the percentage of female migrants seems 
to be increasing, both from Senegal and Africa in general, the current statistics show that 
there are nine times as many Senegalese men in Spain as compared to their female 
counterparts52.  I argue that the reason for this vast contrast in numbers is the difference 
in master narratives of gender for men and women, making the migration project more 
available to men (cf. Moore 1994).  This is not to say that the Senegalese master narrative 
of gender does not allow for variations.  On the contrary; my data shows that women do 
migrate, and they are increasingly taking the same type of risks as men in order to reach 
their destination.  Still, the contestation of hegemonic discourses on Senegalese gender 
roles these female migrants seem to represent are an exception from the rule.  This 
exception can, then, arguably confirm the existence of a hegemonic discourse through the 
friction generated when discourses intersect (Tsing 2005).  The same friction also 
explains the continuous change and flux inherent in such discourses: 
 
[Even if] multiple discourses exist, some discourses are dominant over 
others and some are appropriate only to specific contexts [...].  In the case 
of discourses on the person/self, what appears as dominant models may 
actually turn out to be relatively divorced from everyday life and 
experience. (Moore 1994:34) 
 
Female transnational migration shows that although there exists a general opinion as to 
what women ought to do in life, this opinion is not only undergoing change, but it allows 
for pragmatism when it comes to overcoming the strife of everyday life (Mbow & Bâ 
200853).  Even if a woman’s practice articulates a different discourse than the one 
hegemonic, this might be overlooked, or even applauded, in the cases in which the 
outcome of her practice is favorable for her peers and family.  One such exception is the 
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collective of women I interviewed in the village of Herrixka.  Several of them had arrived 
in the Basque Country through the same strategy:  They had been recruited in Senegal to 
go to Huelva in the South of Spain as seasonal agricultural workers.  Close to the 
expiration date of their issued visas of three months they made off for Herrixka where 
some of them had relatives.  In sum these women, all unmarried, but one with a child 
back in Senegal, followed the same sort of strategy as what their male counterparts could 
have done.  The motivations driving these migrant women seem to be much the same as 
the men’s; earning and saving up money, but they did not mention “helping the family” 
when listing their reasons, even if all of them claimed to send remittances as often as 
possible.  The discrepancy in the discourse of male versus female migrants thus seems to 
lie in the articulation, or lack thereof, of their role of household provider.  Additionally, 
the fact that these women migrate might also delineate a certain type of conflict created 
in the meeting of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ in the Senegalese context that I will analyze 
further below. 
 
But the bottom line remains; migration is predominantly undertaken by men.  As my 
female informants have been fewer and less available, and I do not claim to present an 
exhaustive overview of strategies available to Senegalese women (or men) when it comes 
to socioeconomic advancement.  I do, on the other hand, imply that one strategy which 
might sooner mean an upper socioeconomic climb for most women rather than men, in 
the way that the contrary is true for men and migration, is marriage.  This does not mean 
that men cannot marry ‘upwards’; one example of this is marriages between Senegalese 
men and toubab54 women.  But on the basis of social institutions in Senegal women are 
more likely to desire, expect, or demand a socioeconomic ascent through marriage than 
men.  Part of the reasons for this, and for men’s migration strategy, lie in ‘tradition’, 
while, as I will illustrate further below, ‘modern’ types of needs and desires also seem to 
play a significant part in the motivation behind life paths chosen by young Senegalese 
today. 
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Women and Marriage  
Mbow and Bâ (2008) claim that the phenomenon of unmarried women is making itself 
continuously more prominent in Senegal, especially among those with higher education 
in urban areas, and that this is in general viewed as problematic.  They argue that “in 
Senegal, the collective conscience, which holds great importance, pushes women to 
consider marriage as a social support, sometimes understood as ‘social peace’” (Mbow & 
Bâ 2008:255).  My empirical data implies that this social support seems to consist in the 
reliance on one’s husband for income and thus the economic and social sustainability of 
one’s family (cf. Lambert 2002).  Traditionally, remaining unmarried has meant being an 
economical burden on one’s ‘biological’ family, as one would be included in the 
household one’s father and brothers had the responsibility of maintaining.  Hence, a 
woman’s social responsibility towards her kin has arguably been to get married.  It has 
also been a ticket to socioeconomic ascent. 
Women’s roles in society have changed, and there are those who work and support 
themselves economically.  The probability of this is higher the more education one has 
(cf. Mbow & Bâ 2008).  Still, I find that my data shows a tendency towards women’s 
desire to marry.  Adawa (26), my hostess in Dakar, studies at the same university where 
Mbow teaches.  Her face lights up when someone calls her by her husband’s last name; 
Madame Sow.  Other women, with less formal education than Adawa, also expressed a 
desire to marry, even my informants in Herrixka; women who had emigrated on their 
own to try their luck in an unknown society.  When I asked these women about plans for 
the future, marriage and children was mentioned by most everyone.   
Mbow & Bâ claim that one of the reasons for why highly educated and working women 
marry less and later are the attitudes of Senegalese men:  “the weight of our traditions, 
[…] essentially patriarchal, makes the masculine gender difficultly accept the superior 
status of a woman” (Mbow and Bâ 2008: 2-356).  But also women in rural areas, in 
regions like Fatick, where the ‘economic environment’ leaves much to be desired, have 
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trouble finding a husband due to migration.  The authors thus claim that the economic 
crisis in Senegal is altering gender relations in that men are becoming more accepting of 
women’s status increase once they actually might depend economically on this, and that 
women in rural areas many times marry later than before, since so many of the young 
men migrate (Mbow and Bâ 2008:2). 
This is in line with my own observations from the field.  There exists a general discourse 
in terms of gendered subject positions, expressed by both women and men, but life’s 
challenges might cause a renegotiation of these for pragmatic reasons.  But the gender 
identities tied to these subject positions are still strong and very much articulated in 
Senegalese society.  While some women choose to get married later, others have to wait 
due to the absence of eligible bachelors.  Still, as even rural villages are connected to the 
global processes at large in the world, young women (and men) are bound to make more 
varied choices than before.  As traditional systems of production are altered and 
‘development’ creates new needs, ‘modernity’ inspires new desires (cf. Lambert 2002).   
 
One way for men to meet these desires is through the migration project.  Based on 
‘traditional’ structures of gender roles it is then natural that a woman’s  ‘modern’ desires 
should be aspired to first through the most culturally accepted forms of social 
advancement; marriage.  As both ‘modern’ law and ‘tradition’ permit Senegalese men to 
engage in polygyny, Senegalese womanhood also implies relating to this possibility.  
Since Senegalese women arguably desire to marry into socioeconomic stability, and even 
affluence, and the same qualities are necessary for a man to marry more than one woman, 
polygyny seems tied to migration through the concepts of social, economical, and 
symbolical capital (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  This will be discussed further below, after 
discussing ‘traditional’ versus ‘modern’ conceptualizations of gender. 
 
‘Tradition’ and Gender Roles: Kinship and Household Organization 
The fact that my informants have certain ways of organizing their lives based on what 
they conceive as ‘tradition’ does not mean that there exists an essential institution within 
Senegalese society that has not been and will not be altered with time.  It is in moments 
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of change what you had becomes clearer, although it might also lead to a glorification of 
past shapes of the institutions in question (cf. Hobsbawm 1995). Most of my male 
informants, young and old, insisted on maintaining ‘traditional’ gender roles.  A woman 
should respect her husband and her elders, meaning a woman should do what she is asked 
to do.  A good woman is a woman who “knows tradition”.  She does not allow herself to 
be seduced by the Western culture allegedly promoted through television by e.g. wearing 
short skirts or low cut shirts.  Senegalese ‘tradition’ is often postulated as against 
‘Western culture’ when it comes to womanhood, and the traditional relation between 
husband and wife is one where the wife obeys her husband and the morality of the local 
community.  To understand more I asked many of my informants what they considered to 
be a good wife.   
 
Bachir (28) is the oldest brother of Adawa (26), my hostess in Dakar.  He lives in an 
apartment in Herrixka with his uncle in law, Ousseynou (36), and three others.  Bachir 
has been in Spain almost two years and speaks Spanish quite well already.  He was able 
to obtain a contract with a company in the Autonomous Community57 of Asturias and is 
thus a legal resident of the Spanish state.  The contract guaranteed him employment for 
one year, but since its expiration he has been without a job.  He thus decided to stay with 
Ousseynou in Herrixka since the Basque Country still had not been hit as hard by ‘la 
crisis’ as other parts of Spain.  He still has had no luck in terms of finding employment, 
but tries to keep himself busy by taking courses offered to the unemployed by the 
municipality or INEM58.  I asked him about his plans for the future in terms of marriage 
and also what a good wife would be like.  I find that he reproduced the dominant 
discourse of gender roles in Senegalese society through his reply: 
 
To have a good wife…  Since I am the oldest of my family and the one 
with responsibility…for maintaining the household.  To live with...like all 
people... Have  a wife, a son, a daughter.  She should be able to help my 
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mother in the house.  Since I have sisters; all of them will get married.  
Then it is good to have a wife that can help my mother.  That’s why.  But I 
have not found what I want.  I am looking into what I would like. 
  
The Senegalese household is generally large in terms of members, at least in the rural 
villages, which are organized on the grounds of extended agnatic households (cf. 
Fagertun 2009).  In Senegalese, and Serer, society patrilineal practices of inheritance and 
virilocal residence dominate, although matrilineality was the rule in pre-colonized and 
pre-Islam Senegal (Sow 1985) (the legacy of matrilineality can still be seen in the 
glorification of motherhood (Bop 2005), as I will elaborate on below).    
 
Access to productive resources mainly goes through social networks, in particular kin 
groups, thus ones position within such networks is of vital importance for one’s ability to 
provide a livelihood (Sow 1985:564, Perry 2009:57).  The eldest son is expected to bring 
his wife to live in his parents’ household so that this is reproduced and maintained, and 
his wife is considered a supplement to the workforce of the household.  When the parents 
become old the eldest son is also responsible for their care, through his wife.  If there are 
younger siblings living in the household while it is under his care, he is also economically 
and morally responsible for them.  In many instances younger brothers will also bring 
their wives to live in the same household, but this is not ‘obligatory’ in the same sense.  
Things are also changing in the cities, where rent is expensive and maintaining a large 
household can be quite difficult.   
 
Adawa (26) and Ibou (34) explained that they do not live with his family, even if he is the 
oldest son, because it is very unpractical in terms of his work and her studies at the 
university.  Ibou works in the military and is stationed down town.  The job offers them 
inexpensive accommodation in the center, saving them perhaps a couple of hours of 
travelling every day through Dakar’s chaotic traffic in order to get to and from work.  But 
Ibou still upholds his other obligations towards his family, such as weekly visits, 
financial support, and the participation in family religious celebrations, where Adawa, as 
his wife, is expected to join them, and not her own family as she would have done before 
she got married.  ‘Tradition’ thus takes pragmatic turns to accommodate to city life, 
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although this does not mean a divergence from the master narrative of Senegalese 
gendered subject positions, simply a reshaping of the conditions for them.  Conclusively 
it seems plausible to generalize Senegalese gender roles into a distinction between the 
man as provider and woman as nurturer. 
 
Gender, Hospitality and Food:  The Provider and the Nurturer 
The first time I noticed how food matters to the Senegalese, I was invited to celebrate 
Korite59 in Herrixka.  Ramadan was over and we were to celebrate; going from house to 
house to eat.  It was not the first time food had been a topic with my informants; it 
seemed to be something they were in general concerned with.  Food, especially 
Senegalese food, is not taken lightly, so to speak.  It is heavy and filling and takes a long 
time to prepare. 
 
 
7.  Senegalese dinner at a 'baptism' celebration in Herrixka. 
 
When watching television with Adawa in Dakar I recognized some of the dishes I had 
already tasted with my informants in the Basque Country popping up in commercials.  
Happy and laughing women prepare the most abundant dishes and offer them to their 
                                                 
59
 The Wolof name for the celebration of the end of the fasting month of Ramadan (Eid ul-Fitr in Arabic). 
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husbands and children.  Another woman spies on her neighbor to uncover her ‘secret’; 
how does her food always smell so good?  In another commercial a man cannot decide 
between the two dishes offered to him by his two wives; they are both too tempting.  He 
starts dancing of joy when they give him a taste of what they are cooking.   
 
It seems a woman’s gender identity is, through Senegalese doxa, tied to her role as a 
nurturer for her husband and her children (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  This view is confirmed by 
Bop (2005) who writes on women’s role within the Sufi tariqas of Senegal.  These 
powerful religious organizations shape identity construction of both men and women, and 
especially in the Mouride tariqa60 where the image of the ideal woman is portrayed as 
mother (cf. Bop 2005).  The mother holds a particular position for the Mouride through a 
separate cult for Mame Diarra Bousso, the mother tariqa’s founder, whose image 
represents  
extraordinary qualities such as patience, perseverance, commitment, 
loyalty, a spirit of sacrifice, modesty, and the acceptance of seclusion. […] 
[The] behaviors and attitudes that support the structures of the tariqas are 
idealized and presented as normative for all women. (ibid. 2005:1114-
1115). 
The Puzzle of Senegalese Feminine Identity 
Notwithstanding the normative virtues of the ideal Muslim woman, Senegalese 
womanhood holds dimensions that give her image certain ambiguity.  These dimensions 
seem linked to what Bop calls “women’s assumed impurity” (2005:1114).  Seydhi (32) 
once told me, when talking about religion, that they, as Muslims, regard women as a 
“secret”.  That is why she should not be shared with other men.  That is why she should 
dress appropriately when she is outside her home.  Ousmane (28) stated some of the same 
opinions; Senegalese women have something indescribable, something special.  So apart 
from their ability to nurture, they are alluring in the ways they relate to their men.   
 
Women are both the object of men’s desire, beautiful and seductive, and representations 
of aspects of society gone wrong.  They are at the same time the bearers and destroyers of 
                                                 
60
 The Mouride brotherhood was founded in Senegal, as opposed to the other large Sufi brotherhoods 
active in the country, by Ahmadou Bamba, now a respected historical figure of Senegal.  Many of my 
informants belong to the Mouride brotherhood. 
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‘tradition’.  Senegalese men seem to be proud of the beauty of their women, and 
Senegalese women in general take great care to look their best according to their means.  
But the conspicuous consumption involved in this quest for beauty is frowned upon by 
men, especially when they themselves are unable to finance it.   
 
This ambiguity towards women appears related to men’s will to migrate.  Migration can 
increase a man’s eligibility as a husband:  It can help finance marriage and economically 
support the household.   The factor of conspicuous consumption, by both men and 
women, is also important in this regard.  Friedman (1991:161) argues in opposition to 
Appadurai (1986) that “[things] do not have social lives.  Rather, social lives have things”.   
 
Modernity in Senegal is characterized by a new pattern of consumption; its 
conspicuousness is now related to products that are economically difficult to attain for 
many, while the ‘need’ for the same products seems to augment (cf. Lambert 2002).  
Women are construed by men as unveiling “the fundamental principle of modern 
consumerism [, namely] the realization of the private fantasy driven by a desire that can, 
by definition, never be satisfied” (Friedman 1991:158, with reference to Campbell 1987).   
 
Bashir’s (28) statement above shows that women, according to many men, are more 
readily seduced by the desires produced by globalized ‘modernity’.  But this seduction of 
femininity also makes her all the more beautiful and desirable herself, while her demands 
in terms of what a man ought to bestow upon her become greater.  A man’s desire to 
attract women can thus become frustrating in that ‘modernity’ unsettles the power 
relations between the genders.  Although the doxic discourse on gendered subject 
positions appears unchanged, the dynamics between men and women are more 
unpredictable than before, and render a renegotiation of gender identity and power 
possible (cf. Bourdieu 1977, Moore 1994).  Even if ‘traditional’ household structures are 
preached, both by individuals and e.g. through the media, what is practiced within 
families and couples is a subtle but perpetual (re-)negotiation of power structures that 
women might slowly be gaining more access to.  The feelings of ‘abjection’ (cf. Ferguson 
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1999) this (re-)negotiation can produce are articulated in e.g. men’s dualistic 
conceptualization of the Senegalese woman and elders’ stance on today’s youth.  
Intergenerational Power Struggles 
“A generational contrast can […] be made between those who grew to adulthood in the 
first two decades of African independence (1960-80), and their successors who see their 
‘youth’ as something which is at risk of becoming indefinitely prolonged” (Cruise 
O’Brien 1996:58). The structures present in the lives of contemporary Senegalese men 
and women are different than those of their parents’ or grandparents’ youth.  As local 
lives and economies have become increasingly intertwined with global processes (cf. 
Lambert 2002, Tsing 2005), living a ‘good life’ becomes difficult.  The definition of a 
‘good life’ is informed by both ‘modern’ desires of commodity consumption (cf. Lambert 
2002) and ‘traditional’ practices of household, gender, and generational relations.  
Although ‘traditional’ practices and discourses are a very significant part of 
contemporary Senegalese society, there arguably exists inter-generational conflict on 
account of ‘modern’ practices.  The critique of youth by elders seems particularly 
directed towards the woman, perhaps because a change for the ‘Western’ in her subject 
position would indicate great instability within Senegalese patriarchal structures (cf. 
Perry 2009). 
 
The power negotiation between the genders thus shares the characteristics of the 
processes taking place between the older and younger generations in Senegal.  Perry 
(2009) describes the opposition of young men against their elders in rural areas of 
Senegal.  The village elders sanction this opposition through coercive acts of physical 
violence performed by local police in cooperation with the elders.  Perry argues that these 
sanctions show the male elders’ quest for power affirmation in a ‘modern’ environment 
that is continuously questioning their authority.  There lies a paradox in the elders’ use of 
representatives of the same state that is challenging their authority, to affirm and regain 
their power. 
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8. Graffiti in Sine Saloum: "Discipline leads to peace". 
 
 
Similar dynamics are arguably visible in the accounts of Madame Dia, one of the elderly 
women I was able to speak to in Dekka.  She told me that today’s generation does not 
know the tradition because they do not live in it.  When I asked for an example she spoke 
to me about women and the devils: 
In the past women did not go out at night, but today they do.  In the night 
the woman who goes out can meet a devil and it can make her sick.  Both 
in her head and her body.  It is not the same for men, because if men see 
the devil they can control it.  The devil can be in the fields or outside of 
them.  Everywhere.  They can live in the trees.   
 
My interpreter explains that there is a devil in the same tree we are sitting beneath:  
“There is a certain hour at night when the devils come out,” he says.  “Around midnight”.  
I ask if Madame Dia has ever seen a devil.  She replies that “the night is for the devils, 
the day is for the people”.  But she and her son tell me a story of a man who met one:   
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Djibril met a devil.  He lived on this land.  Now he is dead.  He died 
because he met a devil.  He got sick in the head.  In general men who meet 
the devils are not affected.  Djibril lived in Dakar.  He did not know the 
things that happen on this land.  When he came to Dekka he went to see 
his sister at night.  In the street he met a devil who gave him a sickness 
that killed him.  The sister did not get sick.  There are people who can 
fight against the devil.  The sister could fight the devil, Djibril could not.  
His sister has seen five devils, while Djibril only saw the devil once.  The 
sister could fight against the devil because she knew how.  You use water 
and you recite a verse from God.  You pour it on your body before going 
out in the street.  Djibril did not know of this phenomenon to fight against 
the devil.  In general people in Dekka know.  There are people in Dakar 
who know how to fight with the devil because they come to Dekka to talk 
to the elders [to learn how]. 
 
We continue to talk about the city, about Dakar.  Madame Dia expresses disapproval over 
the behavior of this generation’s women.  In her time women did not go out at night.  
They did not have television and did not go to the cinema.  A woman should stay with 
her family at night.  If she sees films from Europe she should not practice what she sees:  
“It is not the same for the people who live in this village.  It is not the same civilization.” 
 
Perry’s (2009) cases of intergenerational conflict and the views of Madame Dia arguably 
show a tendency of elders’ discontent with today’s Senegalese youth.  While Madame 
Dia did not seem to try to sanction the behavior of the youth other than through her 
verbal discontent, the elderly (men) in Perry’s accounts did.  Still I find that both cases 
underline a general apprehension seen in Senegalese cultures today, namely the fear of 
loss of tradition.   
 
In the traditional social structures lays power, and thus privileges (be they material or 
intangible), bestowed upon certain individuals.  Both in the case of elderly versus youth, 
and in men versus women, the renegotiation of these power structures naturally alarm 
those currently in charge; the elderly and the men.  I will now look at how the gendered 
subject positions discussed above are expressed through the symbolic values articulated 
through food and its consumption. 
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Food and Hospitality:  Teranga Abroad and at Home 
When the migrants are away they think back on the food prepared to them at home with 
longing, while they also stay connected with their homes through the food prepared and 
consumed in exile.  Food is also important in terms of the rituals around eating, an aspect 
many of my informants commented on.  They themselves drew parallels to what they 
consider an important difference between European and Senegalese culture; namely the 
teranga; the Senegalese hospitality and solidarity.  Teranga is present in the way 
everyone gathers around the same big plate, eating together using their hands.  They 
consume and reproduce their cultural identity through sharing a meal.  Teranga through 
the consumption of food symbolizes how, and is one of the concrete ways in which, a 
Senegalese will always help someone in need if he/she can.  I was told repeatedly, both in 
the Basque Country and in Senegal, that “in Senegal you will never go hungry”.  
Strangers are welcomed into homes to eat, sleep, and receive any assistance they need.  
Teranga is a cultural trope that is widely and proudly spoken of.  It is even the slogan of 
Senegal as a country when advertised to tourists:  “Senegal – The Land of Teranga”.  The 
relationship between teranga and food is thus both material and symbolical, and it is also 
gendered.   
 
The typical Senegalese way of serving a meal is in a big dish placed on the floor or the 
ground.  People sit around it and everyone has their own little ‘corner’ in the dish.  In the 
Sine Saloum region what is served every evening is Senegalese couscous, made of barley, 
while in other regions, such as Dakar, rice or potatoes is a more common basis of the 
meal.  In the middle of the dish, on top of the couscous or rice, a mix of vegetables, meat 
or fish is placed.  The amount varies with the number of people and what the family can 
afford.  Usually a sauce is then poured into each person’s little ‘pocket’ rounded out with 
your right hand.  Everyone then proceeds to eat, lumping the food together in their right 
hand and pushing it into their mouths.  The women, usually the one ‘in charge’ of the 
meal, having made it, divides up the protein rich food in the middle of the dish with her 
hand and distributes small pieces of it throughout the meal to each person participating.  
She thus makes sure everyone gets their share and that nobody goes hungry.  As a guest I 
was repeatedly told by both women and men to eat more:  “Il faut manger!”   
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The woman thus becomes the nurturer of both the household members and those visiting; 
she is the one responsible for the materialization of teranga, while the man is the one 
responsible for ‘putting food on the table’ in a more abstract sense; for providing the 
means necessary for the family to be able to eat (Perry 2005: 215).   
 
This sense of solidarity is a way of establishing new social relationships and maintaining 
those already at hand.  It is also a manner in which one is able to show the household’s 
status.  If one is able to care for and share with many, the household is both considered to 
hold enough resources for this, signifying economic stability or even abundance, and to 
consist of good people; people who share and redistribute their wealth.  Since the 
distribution happens through the woman’s responsibilities within the household she 
becomes the signifier in the teranga symbolism, but the implicit cause of her ability to 
carry out the ‘sharing and caring’ is the man’s hard work and ability to care for his family.  
Hence, a man who is, through his income, able to care for many, is a good man, and the 
woman, or women, by his side, who convert the man’s financial care into nurture, are 
good women.  Teranga thus means more than hospitality; it means distancing yourself 
from egotistical action and individualism, promoting what some of my informants have 
called the ‘African’ notion of family, reciprocity and solidarity, factors implicit in the 
gender identity and subject positions of Senegalese men and women. 
Affluence and Polygyny 
Another practice of the Senegalese teranga, and an important aspect of Senegalese male 
identity and status, is, as mentioned, reflected in polygyny. The general financial 
difficulties in Senegal in combination with a female population who allegedly demands 
increasingly more from their men, also leads to a reduction of the number of men who are 
able to marry more than one woman.  
 
Omar (52) in Dekka tells me that before a man could maintain four wives with 
approximately 40.000 francs CFA per month, but now even 100.000 francs CFA a month 
are not enough.  There are fewer marriages now than before, he says:  “I will give you an 
example:  I have been married 23 years.  I would like to find another wife.  But I cannot 
make it [financially].  I do not have the means.  If I would have the means I would look 
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for one!”  He tells me that his situation is common, that most men are like him.  “There 
are not the means [to practice polygyny].  Life is expensive.  […]  You are forced to 
remain with only one wife”.  I ask him why men want to have many wives. 
 
I will explain everything now.  Because our religion allows us to have four 
wives.  Islam.  If you have the means you can aspire to this.  If you have 
the means; it is not obligatory.  Because it is said that if you have four 
wives, you have to take care of the four of them.  Everything they want, 
you should find the money so as to give it to them.  Satisfy their needs.  
[…]  If you have the means… Well!  You can find yourself up to four 
[wives]. 
 
I ask him if such a man is considered a ‘big man’.  He tells me that usually yes.  If you 
have four wives you have a great responsibility.  “Do people admire him?” I ask.  
“Admire?” he replies, “Yes, especially the women, eh!  Those four women…  Each one 
has their turn.  They take good care of their husband.  […]  Everything [he] wants [they] 
find to please [him].”  Polygyny thus seems to be desired, in every sense of the word, by 
many men.  More than one wife would signify a rise in status, and imply an a-priori 
possession of the financial means to provide for a large household. 
 
Having more than one wife has long been a sign of affluence and power in Senegal.  
Senegalese feminists argue against polygyny due to the imbalanced power relation 
between a man and his wives in such a marriage (Mbow and Bâ 2008, Bop 2005), but the 
discourses used by intellectuals are not in the same genre as those employed by my 
informants.  Moore’s (1994) contesting discourses conceptualize the ways in which my 
female informants have talked about polygyny.   
 
Bintou is approximately 35 years old and lives in Dekka.  She is originally from Ghana, 
so we speak in English together, but is married to a man from Dekka.  Her husband is 
currently in Spain, where he has made a good life for both himself abroad and his wife 
and children at home.  He has even brought one of their sons there to live with him and 
go to school and the economic success of his endeavors is visible in their home.  The 
house stands apart from many of the other houses of Dekka.  It is made of concrete, as 
opposed to clay.  It has several rooms divided between just her and the children.  There 
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are many pieces of furniture and a big flat screen television.  Bintou is very happy with 
her husband:  “My husband is very good to me.  He loves me very much.  He always 
helps me.” 
  
When I ask her what is needed for a woman to marry a man she says it is important that 
he has a good job:  “If you do not have money, if you do not work, they will not marry 
you”.  This is because women want many children, and many children imply many 
expenses.  She herself only has three, but she would like to have 10, even 15.  She says 
her husband would like this.  “If you do not have many children [your husband] will 
marry another woman to have [them]”.  She does not want to have a co-wife, but she says 
that that is not for her to decide.  Her religion allows her husband to get another wife if he 
so chooses.  For now this is not something he wants, but perhaps in the future, she says.  
If he has the money.  But for her, ‘enough money’ would mean sufficient means to build 
another compound, so that she and the potential co-wife would not live together.  And her 
husband respects this wish. 
 
Amina (26) lives in a neighboring village of Dekka and is married to Biram (32) who 
migrated to the Basque Country two years ago.  She lives with her family in law and 
takes care of her two children.  She used to go to school, but had to leave once she got 
married to perform her duties as a wife.  While Bintou opposes polygyny on a personal 
level because she dreads having to share her household and her husband with another 
woman, Amina welcomes the thought.  For her polygyny is normal and if Biram married 
a second wife it would free her from some of her responsibilities in the house and she 
would be able to pursue her own goals, such as her studies or getting a job to earn her 
own money.  She would like to work in the police or as a teacher and make an income so 
as to take care of her parents and children. 
 
The difference between the discourses employed by my informants vis-à-vis the more 
intellectual discourse of Senegalese feminists, is that they are more pragmatic.  They 
seem largely influenced by my informants’ hopes and aspirations for their own future; the 
ethics and ideology of the practice itself is not questioned.  My informants’ views on 
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polygyny illustrate that ‘traditional’ gendered subject positions remain hegemonic in 
Senegalese society, although how and why they are practiced might vary.  In the next 
section I will look further into the institution of marriage through what is by many 
considered an increasing problem in Senegal; divorce. 
‘Modern’ Paradox: Divorce and the Westernizing of Women 
The paradox at hand comes to show in the conflicts created by these new ways of 
reproducing cultural norms.  While the transcontinental migration of men and the desire 
of women to marry someone well off represent continuity with ‘tradition’, it creates a 
rupture with what is depicted as a harmonious past (cf. Hobsbawm 1983), when everyone 
knew and lived according to ‘tradition’.  Again I will present a mostly male view of this 
paradox, but I find that these views articulate the issues in question substantially. 
 
When talking with people in Senegal I became aware of an acute concern about 
increasing divorce rates and the implication women were seen to have in these.  Seeing as 
women nowadays have become more and more concerned with money and luxury they 
were no longer happy with their husbands even if they were hard workers.  I asked Bashir 
(28) about this upon my return to the Basque Country: 
  
It is true [that divorce rates are increasing]. […] It is the women’s fault!  
The women’s, and the men’s also, but more the women’s.  But it is life 
that is changing.  You can have a husband that works and he helps you, 
and then one day you see your [girl]friend that is very [economically] 
stable.  That’s why they look at their friend and they think “oh my 
husband does not have the capacity to support me, it is better to find a man 
who has more”.  Those are the ideas that break up many marriages in 
Senegal.  That’s the way it is.  It’s the truth.  Many young women break 
out.  That is the problem.  Many materialists.  It is not good.  But I swear it 
is the truth. [...] That is why, before getting married, it is important to take 
it slow, to look for what is good for you.  I am here and I call those living 
in Senegal.  It is better to “look” slowly, call your family, friends…  And 
they tell you about her.  It is better.  And when I go there I will go to her 
house to see how her family lives.  Everything depends on the family, the 
family of the girl.  It is true.  It’s the materialism.  There are many 
materialist girls.  That is why there are many divorced women.  Not 
everyone is like that; there are men who are lucky.  But we cannot all have 
the same type of luck.  And the girls do not understand that.  “Give me 
100 Euros, give me money to buy a mobile phone, give me money to buy I 
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don’t know what, I don’t have that.”  And later she yells “it cannot be, my 
friend, her husband gives her everything she wants!”  That’s it.  There is a 
lot of it.  That’s why now…  Slowly.  Before getting married you have to 
move slowly. 
 
Ousseynou (36), who lives with Bashir in Herrixka, has his wife and child in Senegal and 
whom he has not seen for 3 years due to his ‘illegality’.  He also told me that Senegalese 
women in general want “a lot of money and things”, but in terms of divorce his views are 
more moderate: 
Well, I think divorce is the reality of all countries.  Because we are living 
in the time of globalization.  Of modernization.  Well… There is 
something that changes in people.  Because before having a wife was a 
‘fortune’.  It was not something easy.  To have a wife was a ‘fortune’ and 
you had to preserve that.  But now people get married when they want and 
when they do not want it anymore they get a divorce and that’s that.  
Before it was not like that.  I think it’s the effect of modernization.  I think 
it’s the only reason. 
 
 
An increase in what Bashir calls materialism might very well be one of the reasons why 
divorce rates have gone up.  But this ‘modern’ conspicuous consumption is arguably 
practiced by both men and women; it is men who undertake migration.  Consequently 
migration is part of ‘modern’ Senegal and is one process that splits up families, like in 
Ousseynou’s case.  It is also a way for young men to challenge patriarchal power 
relations, as women do through their requirements for a man worth marrying and staying 
married to.  Migration must thus be seen in light of the seeming dissolve of ‘traditional’ 
patriarchy and kinship organization, although discourses of these organizations continue 
in the practices of the younger generations. 
 
Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how the gendered subject positions of provider and nurturer are 
negotiated and reproduced within the context of ‘modernity’ and change.  I have argued 
that the Senegalese strategies for socioeconomic advance are generally different for men 
and women.  These strategies derive from the Senegalese doxa of hegemonic gender 
discourses, but also challenge the same discourses as they renegotiate ‘traditional’ power 
 97 
relations of gender and generation inherent in Senegalese patriarchal social structures.  I 
have focused on two such strategies; marriage for women and migration for men, and I 
have situated my discussions within the Senegalese context of kinship and hospitality 
practices.  Through the social institutions in Senegalese culture gendered subject 
positions and complementary identities are shaped, and these again render different 
strategies more applicable to one gender than the other.   
 
Migration and marriage as current aspects of transnationality and transcontinentality are 
tied to global forces that act upon local structures of power, resource distribution, and 
income opportunities (cf. Tsing 2005).  These are again reproduced and negotiated 
through social relations such as those between men and women and those within the 
household.  Social relations are shaped by emotions, but these emotions are 
circumscribed by interpersonal and reciprocal expectations both in the sense of what is 
deemed ‘good’ or ‘normal’ behavior and in how a person is supposed to be reciprocated 
(see also Chapter 3).  The shaping of Senegalese gender identity is thus part of migration 
as a global and globalizing process.   
 
The constant flux of gender identities in Senegalese society affects the way migration is 
carried out, but also how migration might be shaping these gender identities.  I have 
postulated that the ways in which Senegalese manhood is construed within Senegalese 
culture, both in terms of men’s role of household provider and the masculine identity 
running parallel to this, molds the patterns of migration both within Senegal and on a 
transnational and transcontinental scale.  Women’s gendered subject positions and 
identity are of course part of this, as the ascription and acquisition of identity is formed in 
the relations between people (cf. Jenkins 2004).  Different aspects of Senegalese gender 
relations, such as family and household structures and what the Senegalese deem 
‘tradition’ and ‘modern’/‘Western’ influences intersect to continue the ever changing 
construction of gender identity.  Chapter 5 will discuss how the current economic crisis 
as a global process affects the Senegalese migration project, and what implications this 
might have on the subject positions discussed above. 
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Chapter 5  
Responses to the Economic Crisis 
 
We are always in crisis. 
   Seydhi (32) 
 
 
Introduction 
‘The Great Recession’ has had enormous impact on the world economy.  Its affect on 
Spain was discussed in Chapter 3, and in this chapter I will elaborate on the discussion of 
how the recession has influenced the migration project in light of the social relations and 
gendered discourses illustrated in the previous chapters.  I will first briefly present the 
predicaments of la crise mondial in Senegal before substantiating the argument that 
global events such as the current economic recession can, over time, have implications 
for the negotiation and reproduction of (gender) identity in Senegal.  Since the global 
event in question is still taking place it is difficult to assess exact outcomes in terms of 
the migration project, but through the narrations of my informants I render visible some 
of the current responses. 
 
Global Crisis in Senegal 
The impacts of the global recession in Senegal are in many cases more indirect and 
perhaps more subtle than in the Global North in general, and Spain in particular (see 
Chapter 3).  Seeing as much of the Senegalese economy is informal and locally based less 
of an effect has been expected here, since the effect of the financial world seems far from 
people’s every day lives.   
 
When talking to people in Senegal I asked them about the economic crisis; if life had 
changed in any way during the last couple of years.  The main concern expressed was the 
rise in prices of basic consumption goods like electricity and staple foods.  This rise in 
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prices is also tied to the international food crisis that commenced the year before the 
global recession, and has run parallel to and intertwined with the latter since its infancy in 
2007.  It is, of course, difficult to assess which ‘crisis’ is causing which changes in 
Senegalese society, as the separation of these global processes seems largely artificial.  
This is not an issue I shall discuss here.  The aim of this section is to appraise the main 
challenges currently faced by the people in Senegal; challenges that illustrate the 
individual’s connection to and vulnerability for global structures at work in the world. 
 
 
9. Global connections:  A prominent global oil and fuel company 
represented at one of the Sine Saloum's most remote islands. 
 
Many of my informants expressed a decline in the access to basic consumption goods.  
The type of goods consumed has not changed, but for many the frequency or the amount 
accessible has.  One elderly woman I interviewed in one of the neighboring villages of 
Dekka told me:  “Right now everything is expensive!  This child (pointing to her 
grandson) eats so much and I cannot work!”  The price of rice, an imported good, has 
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gone up, and now they practically only eat couscous, which they produce themselves, 
thus making them even more dependent on seasonal agricultural yield.  This year’s yield 
has been good, one informant in Dakar explained to me, but for the last decade drought 
has been a major problem.  According to him the Senegalese poverty is not as visible in 
Dakar as other places, especially in the rural villages.  “There you see the reason for why 
people emigrate.  They do not have food.  They survive on solidarity.”  He said that this 
year the rains have been plentiful, so people have not starved.  But the agriculture in 
Senegal depends entirely on the rains because of the lack of technology common in 
Europe and Asia, such as irrigation schemes.  In combination with the lack of 
employment opportunities in rural areas, migration is an important income strategy for 
many, even most, rural households. 
 
Omar (47) in Dekka gave me details about the effects of the crises for his household.  His 
account also illustrates the relationship between husband and wife (see Chapter 4); being 
a man, the provider, means administering the funds of the household by giving his wife, 
the nurturer, money to buy food and fulfill her role :  
Now, in the morning, I give my wife 500 francs [to go to the market] and 
she is not able to make it suffice.  But when I give her 1000 francs, she 
will buy everything for the midday meal.  But before you gave 500 francs 
and she would give you change.  You even got change!  But now you give 
500 francs and you do not get change.  So the prices..  Everything is 
expensive!  Everything has gone up [in price…].  500 francs is just for the 
fish.  I have not taken the rice, the oil into account...  That I have not 
counted.  When you take into account the rice, the fish, the vegetables; 
that will make it 2000 francs or 2500 a day.  That, at the end of the month, 
for the midday meal, makes 75000.  Not counting the evening meal.  […] 
Because here you make couscous in the evenings.  […]  It’s a lot!  So…  
The crise mondial has arrived here, eh! 
 
The Senegalese household’s vulnerability has thus been compensated for by migrant 
remittances; another important factor to take into account upon assessing the impact of 
the international crises.  Many of my informants underlined their dependency on this 
income, especially those in rural areas.  Few admitted great changes in terms of the 
amounts remitted, but official numbers show that this is an important tendency; as the 
migrants in the Global North become unemployed they send less and less to those back 
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home.  One feature article written by the Spanish consul in Dakar, J.V. Sampedro, 
illustrates the loss of income for Senegalese families by pointing to national statistics 
showing the replacement of more nutritious foods, such as meat, eggs, and vegetables, 
with bread:  “The data is clear:  the children’s bellies must somehow be filled, even if 
they are not nutritiously fed.”61. 
 
Sampedro also points to the fact that the Senegalese financial sector is noticing the 
recession, leaving construction projects around Dakar unfinished, while World Bank 
Managing Director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala identifies the "four Fs - the fuel crisis, food 
crisis, the fertilizer crisis and now the financial crisis" 62  as the dangers threatening 
Africans’ daily lives.  She also claims that the financial crisis will have “spillover effects” 
in Africa, e.g. through the potential decrease in international aid remitted by “developed 
countries”. 
 
In sum the global recession is having effects on both macro-related structures within the 
formal Senegalese economy, and on people’s daily lives.  The effects experienced by my 
informants in Senegal are bound to the processes taking place in Europe.  As Senegalese 
immigrants in Spain and other European countries struggle to maintain their strategies for 
social mobility, their families back home notice the household economy becoming  
increasingly tighter.  The next section will look at some of the migrants’ responses to the 
global event at hand and the importance of social networks and relations. 
 
Social Networks and Agency in Exile 
Spain is struggling with record high unemployment and socio-political unrest due to the 
enormous increase in downward socioeconomic mobility.  In this economy immigrants’ 
efforts to not only get by, but to climb upwards within their own socioeconomic 
                                                 
61
“La crisis llega a Senegal” by Juan Vicente Sampedro in La Vanguardia online, published February 24, 
2010.  Viewed May 19, 2010 through the following link:   http://www.lavanguardia.es/lectores-
corresponsales/noticias/20100224/53893400595/la-crisis-llega-a-senegal-africa-europa-dakar.html  
62
 “Effects of Global Financial Crisis Emerges in Senegal” by Ofeibea Quist-Arcton in NPR online, published 
November 4, 2008.  Viewed May 19, 2010 through the following link:  
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96503476  
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hierarchy offer a contrasting, unnerving, and threatening predicament.  In European 
immigration discourse ‘economic’ migrants are not granted the status as ‘deserving’ 
members of society, more common for refugees (cf. Katz 1990, Fuglerud 2001) (see 
Chapter 3).  As people question the state’s ability to provide for its citizens and sustain 
the current welfare system, this is becoming more visible in Spanish “folk discourse” 
(Ortner 2006:24), increasing the impression of immigrants as a threat to the rights of 
autochthonous residents experiencing abjection due to la crisis (cf. Ferguson 1999, Frost 
1999, Newman 1999).  Senegalese in the Basque Country also find themselves in a 
completely different scenario than the one imagined before heading for ‘greener pastures’ 
in Europe.  Practically all of my informants were now unemployed and many had not 
even obtained work experience before the crisis set in, a fact that has had severe 
implications for their current situation in exile, both legally and economically. 
 
Chapter 1 and 4 showed how an agent’s access to the migration project depends on 
certain factors of your point of departure.  Your upbringing shapes the choices you make, 
but the availability of particular resources is paramount.  To be able to undertake 
transcontinental migration from Senegal to Spain social capital in the sense of a social 
network is crucial (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  It is a way of working out, or working around, 
the obstacles faced by Senegalese aiming for migration.  As mentioned above, these 
networks consist of friendship and kinship relations connected through ties of e.g. 
reciprocity.  Relations of reciprocity can be vital when searching for the economical or 
legal support necessary to emigrate from Senegal.  In this subsection I will consider how 
Senegalese social networks and their relations of reciprocity adapt to the environment of 
the Spanish and Basque labor market, and general life in exile.  How does this type of 
social capital matter once the project of migration is threatened by economic downfall? 
 
Solé (2003) regards social networks as an important factor in the Spanish labor market in 
terms of hiring.  The employer often depends on his employees to recruit new employees, 
and the immigrant worker often gets hired through friends or family members who are 
employed.  This sort of informal recruitment and hiring process is quite common in the 
Spanish labor market, but, as seen in Solé (2003); it is not a mere cultural coincidence 
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and not without consequence:   “the immigrant has little bargaining capacity, due to the 
lack of networks of social protection” (Solé 2003:124).   
 
“Networks of social protection” refers to both social networks and more institutionalized 
networks, e.g. the Spanish welfare system.  The immigrant’s access to the latter is limited, 
especially if he is ‘illegal’.  Although laws on empadronamiento (see Chapter 3) ensure 
the ‘illegal’ immigrant basic rights, he does not have access to unemployment benefits or 
education schemes offered by INEM to ‘legal’ workers.   
 
When it comes to social networks I would argue that it is not the lack of social networks 
that poses a problem, but the nature of the networks at hand, confirming Solé’s (2003:124) 
statement that these render the Senegalese immigrant with little “bargaining capacity”.  
As the Senegalese social networks within and beyond Spain are mainly targeted on 
access to the migration project, its focus has been on making the trip to Spain 
economically available, job recruitment, and facilitating housing to members of the 
network.  A change is visible in this regard through the consolidation of various formal 
organizations of Senegalese immigrants, but these organizations hold disadvantages vis-
à-vis e.g. labor unions in that they have a short history of dealing with the Spanish state 
and institutions (cf. Solé 2003). 
 
Nonetheless the social networks do offer the Senegalese migrant valuable assistance.  
Many of my informants expressed their dependency on social relations to get through ‘la 
crisis’.  As most Senegalese live together they support each other economically.  Teranga 
is always present.  It is trusted that the person who is unable to contribute to the 
household will reciprocate at some point. 
We who live here [in this apartment] always help each other out.  If there 
is someone who does not have papers, work, unemployment benefits, nor 
financial aid...  You can live with everything, but nobody will ask you to 
pay the rent if they know you don’t have unemployment benefits or 
financial aid.  We have that [ideology].  We are all the same.  It is like that, 
but life here is tough.  Life here is very expensive, that is why you have to 
have the same [ideology] to live more stable.  For example I could not 
[live alone] here and pay 600-700 Euros a month.  No, I couldn’t.  It’s 
impossible.  It’s better to be 3 or 4 in one house, and every month people 
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contribute and later we pay.  Also with food it’s like that.  Go to [the 
supermarket], buy things.  It is better to search.  It is cheaper.  But that is 
the life of the immigrant.  A life together.  It’s like that, to make life easier. 
          
Bashir (28) 
 
Failure of the Migration Project? 
Global events like the economic recession produces questions of the continuing viability 
of the migration project.  As life takes a turn for the worse and those at home are 
dependant on an income that is not being received, the migrant might ask himself if it is 
better to abandon his mission. 
 
As mentioned it is still difficult to assess the gravity of the economic recession’s effects 
on life of the Senegalese involved, since it is still going on.  But through my informants’ 
narrations it seems that few consider return as an option.  “We are always in crisis,” 
Seydhi (32) said, meaning life in Senegal and the immigrant life in Spain has never been 
easy.  If they have made it so far they will carry on.   
 
Visible in my informants’ accounts is also the significance, beyond economic gain, of 
migration.  Since it is not only the migrants’ own life that is affected the recession, but 
also the conditions for livelihood and prosperity for their families in Senegal,  continuing 
their role as provider seems important, both in practice and symbolically.  Bashir (28) has 
been working ‘legally’ and has thus received unemployment benefits, but his quota has 
now been paid and he will apply for public financial assistance from INEM, which means 
a significant drop in income.  He will keep remitting, he says.  His family in Dakar is 
relatively economically stable compared to many other household.  Still he wants to help: 
My heart feels a lot for my family.  That is why, each month, I can take a 
little and send.  My mother and father always say that “don’t worry about 
sending money.  We are well.  We are living comfortably.  You resolve 
the problems you have there before sending us money”.  But I am not like 
that.  What I have every month I will take a little and send.  To share.  I 
always want to share with people.  It is better! 
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Boukar’s (38) story also seems to reflect the discourse inherent in Bashir’s narrations.  
He lives in Gran Bilbao and has been struggling economically since he came to Spain, 
working as a street vendor.  He sells ‘pirate’ CDs and DVDs, but their market is 
diminishing as internet downloading has become the norm.  La crisis has also made it 
difficult to sell, and he earns less now than he used to:  “I walk and walk, but people do 
not buy.”  He only sends his family remittances when his unstable income allows it:  “I 
only send a little and not every month, if not you cannot eat!”  When I visited Boukar’s 
mother in Thies she exclaimed that “he is a good son; he chose to go so he could help his 
family.  He went in the pirogue and risked everything to help.”  She stressed the 
importance of his contribution for the family’s survival, and pointed out that he sends 
more money now than before:  “Before he did not have a job; now he sells well and sends 
more”. 
 
Bashir’s accounts and the contradiction in Boukar’s and his mother’s narrative of his 
remittances indicate that the migration project arguably bears sociocultural meaning in 
itself.  Knowing that your son is ‘out there’ holds a great significance to those at home.  
The symbolic value of migration as a strategy for fulfilling the male gender role as 
provider, a central aspect of Senegalese masculine identity, shows that social mobility 
moves beyond remittances; it is about taking responsibility and thus cultivating and 
affirming membership in kinship and social networks (Jenkins 2004:150).  In this sense 
migration can be a rite de passage in a young man’s transition into Senegalese masculine 
adulthood (Hernández 2008:45). Or as Boukar said:  “My father had always helped me, 
so I had to get out and find my way in life.” 
 
It is arguably this aspect of the migration project; the conglomeration of social, 
economical, cultural and symbolical capital that it holds (cf. Bourdieu 1977), that 
contribute to its prolongation, even when global structures and events challenge it 
extensively (see also Chapter 3).  It seems the mere fact that the Senegalese migrant finds 
himself in Europe can produce and maintain these types of capital.  Even if the 
accumulation of economical capital is in a rut, the potential for future income is 
maintained as long as the migrant stays abroad.  His exile also produces symbolic capital 
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in that the maintenance of the migration project theoretically can contribute to shape new 
migration projects in the future.  This aspect can also accumulate a rise in social status for 
both him and his family.  Finally, his prolongation of migrant life contributes to the 
cultural symbology of migration in Senegal, visible in e.g. media and folk discourse; the 
migrant as national heroes of the nation, as agents against structural difficulties.  
 
In the friction between Senegalese agents and global and national events and structures 
the impediment of the migration project’s movement could seem probable.  One can 
conceptualize migration as a road in that they are  
a food image for conceptualizing how friction works:  Roads create 
pathways that make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they 
limit where we go.  The ease of travel they facilitate is also a structure of 
confinement.  Friction inflects historical trajectories, enabling, excluding, 
and particularizing. (Tsing 2005:6) 
 
In terms of the economic crisis it seems that the road which global capitalism has made 
available to Senegalese migrants might be restructured.  International and national 
legislation and practices attempt to inhibit the movement that previously has been partly 
welcomed (cf. Solé 2003, Calavita 1998, 2005); the road is being blocked, or at least 
drizzled with check points.  The future of migration between Senegal and Spain is 
difficult to predict.  Through the accumulation of different types of capital Senegalese 
migrants (re-)produce themselves as men and social beings (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  The 
migration projects’ importance for the maintenance and generation of (gender) identity 
and the (re-)production of social relations for both migrant himself and those at home, 
seems to motivate a prolongation of the migration project in spite of the ‘roadblocks’ or 
‘check points’ the crisis seems to generate (cf. Tsing 2005). 
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Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks  
 
 
In this thesis I have asked the questions:   
 
1. In what ways is gender a crucial factor of Senegalese migration projects as a 
principle shaping the migrant’s quest for socioeconomic advancement? 
2. How does the formation of Senegalese (masculine) gender identity interact with 
the processes of constant change of which the transnational migrant household is 
a part through its place in a globalized world? 
3. Particularly; how might Senegalese social institutions (such as kinship, 
generational relations, tradition, and the household) and gender identity affect and 
be affected by the predicaments of the current economic recession, seeing as they 
are shaped in the transaction between global and national structures and 
discourses? 
4. How does the friction between agent and structures play out when it comes to 
Senegalese migrants and the Spanish state, especially considering the current 
economic crisis? 
And: 
- What are the processes that shape migration and marriage as a as paths towards a 
‘good life’? 
- Is this strategy an outcome of structures shaping the (potential) migrant’s desires, 
ambitions and decisions? 
- Or does this strategy take shape through the agency of the individual? 
 
I argue that the migration project is constructed within several dimensions and on several 
levels within the global society. 
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In Chapter 2 I show that migration as a strategy for the maintenance and acquisition of 
livelihood has been a part of the way of life for the West African peoples for centuries.  
This includes nomadic, but also sedentary, groups.  Organizing Senegalese village lives 
into transregional households is common (Lambert 2002), and I argue that transnational 
and transcontinental migration as such represent a continuation of this way of ensuring 
the economical security of the family, as migration has become embedded in socio-
cultural and economical practices of the Senegalese populations over time (cf. Lambert 
2002, Fagertun 2009).  I take a critical stance towards economic migration theory, such 
as the push/pull model, as my informants’ narrations substantiate an argument portraying 
the migration project as based on more than rationale by an economic actor.  It is a 
circular movement and a reciprocal family project (cf. Lambert 2002, Mauss 1995)  
Migration is a result of cultural, historical, and structural processes and is performed by 
individuals who have been socialized by a society and culture that somehow promote this 
strategy through their design.  This has design been shaped, and is promoted, through the 
“power of commodities” as “objects of desire” (Lambert 2002:166, cf. Appadurai 1996, 
Tsing 2005).  The historical, geographical, and globalized economic context of today’s 
Senegal also allow for certain ways of migration, while excluding others, through a 
complex set of circular-like processes (cf. Tsing 2005). 
 
In Chapter 3 I consider how global, international, and national power structures and 
events influence my informants’ strategies for social mobility (cf. Tsing 2005).  I 
especially focus on Spanish immigration law and the current economic crisis at large in 
Spain.  The synthesis of Spanish legislation has implicitly and explicitly allowed for, 
even encouraged, certain types of immigration that have been beneficial to the Spanish 
economy’s growth (cf. Calavita 2006).  International legislation, as articulated through 
the UN and EU, reproduce discourses of immigration both as a threat and a moral 
responsibility (when it comes to those in ‘need’; refugees).  These discourses are 
hegemonic in the Global North countries’ immigration policies in general, also in Spain 
(cf. Fuglerud 2001). 
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I argue that although my informants verbally try to adapt to what I call the discourse of 
‘need’ (cf. Katz 1990, Fuglerud 2001) so as to ‘deserve’ their presence within the Spanish 
state, they generally continue their socio-cultural practices from Senegal, as it is within 
this doxa their sociality, and thus aspirations for socioeconomic ascent, are embedded (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977).  Spanish immigration policies have until recently ‘allowed’ for this 
arguable quest for upward social mobility.  Although the legislation appears paradoxical, 
aiming towards a Spain free of ‘illegal’ immigrants, it is shaped in a manner that makes 
‘illegality’ almost inevitable.  Several authors have argued that these paradoxical policies 
have been beneficial to a Spanish economy in dire need for cheap labor while undergoing 
its own quest for upward mobility; development (cf. Calavita 1998, 2006; Solé 2003). 
 
It is now that the recession has affected Spain’s core that this legislation, and all the new 
residents of Spain, are causing a headache for the authorities and evoking fear in its 
autochthonous people.  The discourse of “migration as a threat” (cf. Boswell 2003) has 
been strengthened in the last few years on the grounds of ‘the terrorism threat’ and the 
‘avalanche’ of ‘illegal’ migrants reaching Mediterranean Europe’s shores.  As examples 
of the escalation of the “migration threat” discourse I show how Spain has been highly 
involved in the formation and activities of EU’s Frontex in order to limit illegal 
immigration. Once the recession commenced this discourse has become even more 
relevant and both legislation and legal practices have been altered, as exemplified 
through the case of the 2009 reform of the Ley de extranjería and the municipal 
government of Vic’s change of empadronamiento practice.  Through my informants’ 
narrations I illustrate the friction generated between the agent and macro structures (cf. 
Tsing 2005). 
 
In Chapter 4 I argue that the migration project is embedded in local sociocultural 
practices and that in order to understand this project it is important to investigate its 
embeddedness.  Access to this ‘strategy’ for movement is thus shaped by dimensions such 
as economy, social capital, generation, and, perhaps especially, gendered subject 
positions (cf. Lambert 2002, Moore 1994, Bourdieu 1997).  Hence I show how migration 
is a more likely to be undertaken by men than women when considering the dominant 
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discourse of gender.  This also ties migration to the construction of gender identity, as it 
is one of the ways in which Senegalese men strive to fulfill their expected roles as 
providers (cf. Jenkins 2004).  This role relates dualistically to that of women’s role as 
nurturer as illustrated in how household and kinship is organized ‘traditionally’.  My 
informants’ stories support my argument that this leads to difference in the most probable 
strategies taken for social mobility by men versus women; migration being more common 
for men, and marriage for women.  Through my their narrations I show how ‘modern’ 
influences both challenge the hegemonic gender identities of Senegalese society, and 
preserve them through the practices of ‘traditional’ values, such as those reflected in 
religious practices and discourse, within ‘modern’ lives, by many seen as corrupted by 
materialism (cf. Moore 1994, Tsing 2005).   
 
The dynamics between transnational migration as a ‘modern’ phenomenon, on the one 
hand, and its implications in the construction of Senegalese gender relations and 
identities on the other, thus present a paradox.  This identity construction is largely done 
according to normative and hegemonic discourses of gender embedded in Senegalese 
social and cultural structures, and it is these structures the agent seeks to ascend within 
through transnational migration, making him a more desired husband and provider.  The 
migration project thus contributes to the reproduction of women’s desire for marrying 
‘upwards’ to better fulfill their role as nurturer.  Hence, migration, despite its inherent 
transnational ‘modernity’, arguably contributes to a reproduction of ‘traditional’ gender 
discourse. 
 
Chapter 5 muses briefly on Senegalese responses to the current economic crisis.  In 
Senegal my empirical data indicates that the current increase in the prices of basic goods 
is arguably tied to both the economical recession and the international food crisis.  The 
difficulty in sustaining a household is noticed by my informants in Senegal due to the 
price increase, but currently it seems it is my informants in Europe who have noticed the 
greater change.  From having a stable income, or at least prospects for it, they are left to 
wait.  But their unwavering attitudes regarding their strategy of movement implicate the 
importance of the migration project for the accumulation of social, economical, cultural, 
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and symbolic capital.  This capital accumulation contributes to the (re-production) of the 
Senegalese household and the gendered identities embedded in it.  Global events like the 
current economic crisis can therefore potentially produce change in discourses on identity 
and gendered subject positions (cf. Moore 1994, Tsing 2005).  
 
Through patterns in my informants’ narrations I argue that the socio-cultural network my 
Senegalese informants are a part of as migrants constitutes a form of (social) capital.  
This capital has arguably been invested in the migration project allowing my informants 
to reach Spain through friendship and kinship relations.  Through these relations the 
migrants can access the financial aid for travel expenses, documents, employment, and 
domicile necessary for their project.  The social network of solidarity between the 
Senegalese has stayed strong and has been one of the ways in which my informants have 
survived, and are still surviving, the crisis.  I posed the question of how things might have 
been different if it were not for this social network of solidarity.  If my informants had 
relied more on formal organizations, such as trade unions, for assistance before the crisis, 
and thus become part of a more formal network with power within the Spanish state, 
perhaps their economic ascent would not have stagnated as quickly as is the current case, 
since they might have had more of an opportunity to contest the structures that no longer 
make room for them.  Still, through presenting cases from both Senegal and Spain, I have 
substantiated my argument of the migration project’s significance in terms of the 
accumulation of capital; economical, social, cultural and symbolical.  The Senegalese 
migrant’s strategy of ‘waiting the crisis out’ is thus arguably the best investment he can 
do for the future of him and his family. 
 
      * 
 
My informants’ ambitions are thus directed towards the social and economic structures of 
Senegal, where his family resides.  To the extent that the migration project can be said to 
be a strategy for social mobility, as indicated by my informants’ accounts, it is the 
structures of ‘back home’ the mobility is measured against.  Still, the migration project 
depends on a functioning Spanish economy and society.  I therefore ultimately argue that 
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the economic recession of Spain has severe impact on the Senegalese migration project 
through global encounters and events (cf. Tsing 2005). However, since migration, as 
argued in Chapter 2 and 4, goes beyond economic meaning in Senegalese culture, it 
would not be reasonable to abort this strategy for movement.  Being a migrant is also 
about identity and gender relations, and ‘waiting out’ the recession is thus meaningful 
both to the migrant and to those he provides for in Senegal. 
 
To answer the initial questions of migration in terms of the structure/agency debate I have 
argued that in the case of Senegalese migration to Spain and the Basque Country there 
are local, national and global structures at work (cf. Tsing 2005).  The agent bears with 
him the habitus of his culture and society, shaping his way of acting upon structures (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977, Swartz 2002).  The flux within doxa itself is important here, as 
discourses are articulated and challenged on different levels and within different 
dimensions (cf. Moore 1994).  The hegemonic discourse on e.g. Senegalese gender 
relations and identities are thus challenged, intersected, and overlapped by alternative 
discourses within the same social structures (ibid.), while the agent himself seeks to both 
ascend within social networks and construct his identity through the engagement with 
these different discourses (Jenkins 2004:149-150). The possible effects of these processes 
on an individual’s construction of identity are apparent in “the importance of cross-
cultural and long-distance encounters in forming everything we know as culture […].  
Cultures are continually co-produced [through] ‘friction’:  the awkward, unequal, 
unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference” (Tsing 2005:4).   
 
In Chapter 2 I argued that although the motivations behind the strategy of migration 
might be primarily economic, in that they are articulated through “the allure of 
commodities” (Lambert 2002:166), it is important to consider how economics is 
embedded in other aspects of life, i.e. social relations and organization (cf. Fagertun 2009, 
Lambert 2002).  In Chapter 4 I showed how migration is tied to discourses of gender 
relations and identity and that (transnational) migration seen through such a lens 
represents a more probable strategy for socioeconomic ascent for men than for women.  
In Chapter 3 and 5 demonstrated that strategies laid do not always work out and might 
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need revision as you go along.  Intervening events, like la crisis in this case, can lead to 
the reconsideration of one’s life course.  I have shown that some migrants take an active 
stand to their situation, and put plans they had in mind for the far future into life at an 
earlier stage.  But in many cases advancing economically in spite of the financial crisis is 
practically impossible due to the migrant’s legal, economical and social situation.  In this 
regard I point out that the failure to succeed economically might not mean social failure 
to those at home, since the doxa of Senegalese society applauds men taking their 
responsibility as providers seriously (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  My empirical data shows that 
for those at home having a family member abroad arguably increases social capital since 
their exile symbolizes future access to valued commodities through ties of reciprocity, or 
even a pathway for future migrants from within the same social network (cf. Lambert 
2002).  The meaning of migration as a re-negotiator and re-embedder of social identity 
within Senegalese society thus rings true for the migrant, while also giving hope of 
material and social wealth for both him and his social relations.  Hence, by ‘waiting out’ 
the crisis he demonstrates action, even agency; a willingness to overcome great obstacles 
in order to (re-)produce his subject position as provider (cf. Moore 1994). 
 
Conclusively, by presenting cases from both Senegal and Spain I have substantiated my 
argument throughout this thesis that the migration project bears meaning beyond that of 
economic gain seen through the lens of linear ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (cf. Riccio 2008, 
Lambert 2002, Fagertun 2009).  Senegalese migration is a social endeavor as it is 
embedded in social relations and institutions. It bears significance both in terms of 
identity construction and the symbolic value in having a family member abroad inherent 
in the migration project (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  Migration as movement is severely 
challenged by external dynamics, such at the worldwide economic recession and Spanish 
immigration legislation, particularly in terms of its economic dimension (cf. Tsing 2005). 
However, the migration project does not lose all meaning and value when faced by such 
global encounters; it might still contribute to agents’ accumulation of different capital, 
and even upward social mobility, through the mere ‘waiting it out’-strategy performed by 
many Senegalese migrants in Spain. 
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